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CHAPTER I 
AMERICAN LITERARY MAGAZINES AND THE 
"Wi,W IMP ERIALI5W' 1893-1898 
The most tantalizing problems facei by students of international 
relations are those which revolve around the question of motivation in 
nationRl action. The role of ideas and attitudes in determining the 
behavior of nations is an obtrusive factor in Avery international 
situation. 1 
Thus Albert Weinberg pinpoints a fascinating phase that has special 
significance in the study of the "new imperialism." Dr. Albert Shaw 
strengthens \veinberg's assertion, when he declares that expansion is no 
exception to the thesis that "the power and persistence of ideas lie at the 
base of all historical movements.,,2 Parker T. Moon, discussing the dynamics 
of imperialism, stated that "not direct interests, but ideas, not property 
or profession but principles, activate the public at large,1I that it is the 
theories of the propagandists of expansion that impel nations to action.3 
Various writers have studied these ideas and attitudes of the "new 
imperialism" that, as Weinberg, Shaw, and Moon maintain, may determine the 
behavior of a nation, and they have found in their studies that these 
lAlbert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 1935), Foreword, ix. 
2Albert Shaw, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Evolution of Democracy," 
Proceedings 2f ~ Academy of Political Science, VII (1917), p. 471. 
3Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and l:orld Politics (New York, 1930), p. 67. 
1 
2 
attitudes and ideas fall into significant patterns of thought. Weinberg 
states that the ideology of American expansion is: 
• • • its motley body of justificatory doctrines. It comprises 
metaphysical dogmas of a nrovidential mission and quasi-scientific 
'laws' of national development, conceptions of national right and 
ideals of social duty, lee:al ration~lizations and app8als to the 
'highest law,' aims of extending freedom and designs of extending 
benevolent absolutism. 4 
Here then, are the findings of one author as to the significant patterns of 
thought that have been found to be a basis for the "new imperialism" of 1898. 
This thesis accepts the definition of "new imperialism" as generally accepted 
and studied by \\einberg. To limit so complex a matter as the ideology of 
expa;lsion to these few concepts is to run the risk of oversimplification; 
therefore, no claim is made that these were the only ideological stimulants 
to expansion. But it is likely that these ideas were crucial" and it is 
believed that they offer a sound b<.:.sis for the analysis of expansionist 
ideology here being undertaken. 
other \Y-riters on this subject studied America's imperialism from a 
different viewpoint. Some authors, as Moon and vJeinberg, have studied jt 
within the wider scope or vision of world imperialism. Still others" as 
r.rnest May and Theodore Greene have situated their studies in a rr.ore political 
and diplomatic background of events and happenings. Some have given it a 
predominantly economic slant, as Charles Beard; others a defensive national 
interest point of view. Most authors have admitted and studied the ideo-
logical background, and have nointed out the importance of literature, both 
'iieinberg, Introduction, p. 2. 
3 
newspapers and periodicals, in the spread of these ideas. Marcus Wilkerson 
analyzed public opinion in general and the Spanish-American War, while Joseph 
Wisan concentrated on the New York press and the Cuban crisis, and Dr. Richard 
Matre in a doctoral dissertation analyzed the Chicago press and imperialism. 5 
This thesis prODoses to study the patterns of thought as reflected in 
certain American literary magazines of that time. Special attention is given 
primarily to Nation and Forum, to find out if and how these patterns of 
thought were reflected in the specific periodicals, either responding to or 
reacting against, these ideas -- ideas following the patterns, to an extent, 
of author Weinberg -- of "inevitable destiny," of "white man's burden," and 
the related ideas of "self-defense" for the United ~tates, of "paramount 
interest," and of "world leadership." This is the major concern and research 
of the paper. 
Nation and Forum were chosen as being typical of the literary magazines 
of that time, and other magazines may be cited only occasionally to support 
or strengthen some idea or to show the similarity of idea in other periodicals. 
Nation and Forum were chosen because, according to Mott's analysis of them 
their influence was significant due to the type of writers propounding their 
ideas therein, and because of the type, not necessarily number, of subscribers 
to these two periodicals. 
~rcus Wilkerson, Public Qpinion and ~ Spanish-American ~ (Baton 
Rouge, 1932), Joseph ~'Jisan, ~ Cuban Crisis .:i!! Reflected .in ~ ~ 1.Q.rk 
Press, 1895-189~, (New York, 1934), and Richard A. Matre, ~ Chicago Press 
~ Imperialism, 19S9-l902, Abstract of Dissertation, 1961. 
4 
It is a truism that great movements are said to begin among the intelli-
gentsia and then drift down to popular expression. Of interest then, would 
be to see to what extent these patterns of thought are found in magazines 
devoted to the upper class. The American literary magazine, rather than the 
general newspaper or popular magazine, form the intellectual milieu of the 
United States, and it is the intelligentsia who are interpreting these patterns 
of thought underlying the "new imperialism," reacting to them, and being in-
fluenced by them. The intellectuals who wrote for Nation and Forum were often 
political leaders, reflecting at least one segment of American political 
thought. 
The editors of these American periodicals cannot be passed over. 
Lorettus S. Metcalf, Walter Hines Page, Alfred Ernest Keet, and Joseph M. 
Rice, as editors of Forum, contributed greatly to the formation of public 
opinion. h'riting on Metcalf, first editor of Forum, F. L. Mott observed: 
Metcalf conceived it to be his initial editorial duty to determine 
what topics were of greatest timely significance and widest public 
interest, and then to secure experts on those subjects to discuss 
them in his magazine. This resulted in a very distinguished list 
of contributors. • • • It would be difficult to find a better 
exposition of the more serious interests of the American mind in 
the decade 1886 to 1896 than is afforded by the first twenty 
volumes of the Forum. 6 
Of significance is the notable roll of contributors including senators, bishops 
college presidents, and well-known novelists, e.g. Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, 
George F. Hoar, J. B. Foraker, and Shelby M. Cullom. 
6Frank Luther Mott, 1l History of American Magazines, )..8~5-1905 
(Cambridge, 1957), pp. 511-512. 
5 
Commenting on the Forum at the time of Metcalf's retirement, the Review 
of Reviews maintained that many men of England considered the magazine one of 
the "ablest and timeliest ll periodicals in its class, and it thought that Page, 
the succeeding editor, should continue to follow the policy and general line 
of thought that made the Forum so successful.7 In following this same 
emphasis, Walter Hines Page's chief interest was also the enlistment of famous 
and expert writers to comment on significant affairs. 
After Page's departure for the Atlantic Monthly, his assistant, Alfred 
Ernest Keet, carried on for several years, followed by Joseph Rice from 1897-
1907. Dr. Rice lacked the originality and agressiveness of his predecessors, 
but he continued the traditions of Forum with respect to specialist writers 
and symposiums. 
In the same way, in regard to another literary magazine, the Nation, 
Frank Luther Mott, in his analysis of American Magazines, again stated that 
the list of the early contributors to Nation enrolled most of the famous 
scholars and writers of the sixties and seventies and kept its contributors 
in the eighties and nineties. Writers like Bryce and Dicey, English cor-
respondents Higginson and Norton, such Harvard men as Channing, Hary, 
Kittredge, and Winson, became Nation contributors, with others such as Joel 
Chandler Harris, William Roscoe Thayer and James Ford Rhodes, as occasional 
writers for the magazine. 8 
7Review of Reviews, III (April, 1891), p. 288. 
8 Mott, III, p. 335, p. 346. 
The inf~_uence of Nation far exceeded its circulation. Its subscribers 
have included libraries, universities and other educational centers in the 
count~r and its contributors, as have been listed, included the educated 
leaders who sway opinion. James Bryce observed that it was read by two 
classes of people, which in America have a strong influence in forming 
political a:ld economic opinio~, namely, editors and University professors. 9 
E. L. ~ikin, founding Nation in 1865, showed at once a distinctive 
6 
style, a refreshing penetration, and a skill in ironic analysis never before 
equalled in American journalism. 
Allan Nevins in American Press Opinion asserted that the greatest role 
in the leadership of opinion in the generation preceding the Civil War had 
.. 
been played by Horace Greeley, and the "greatest single part in the next 
generation W'dS with little doubt that of E. L. Godkin." From 1865 until 1899 
Godkin was editor-in-chief of the Nation. Nevins felt that directly Godkin 
never addressed more than 35,000 subscribers to the two publications, Nation 
and Evening ~, but indirectly, as filtered "down through to the other 
journals, through pvlpits~ through college chairs, and by word of mouth," 
his opinions affect.ed ai.most every corner of the land.10 
These were the magazines then, that are recordings of a climate of 
opinion, and the historian cannot ignore them except at his peril. 
9James Bryce, Studies in Contemporary Biography (New York, 1903), 
p. 372, p. 378. 
10Allan Nevins, American Press Opinion (Chicago, 1928), pp. 299-300. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE PATTERNS OF THOUGHT OR MOTIVES 
UNDERLYING THE "NEW IMPERIALISM" 
Underlying the whole problem of expansion, it would seem are the ideas 
that motivate it, give it direction, and furnish its semantics. 
What, then, are the principal beliefs constituting the rationale of 
late nineteenth century American expansion? Basically the ideology fell 
into patterns derived from 1) science 2) humanitarianism 3) economics and 
4) politics, and comprised, first of all, rationalizations of "inevitable 
destiny," making full use of Darwin's "survival of the fittest." They 
included, secondly, the altruistic motive of extending freedom, benevolence, 
and civilization to races less blessed. Thirdly, they elaborated on all 
the concomitant doctrines of self-defense, of naval power, and of necessity 
against foreign imperialism. The patterns then abetted the economists' 
glorification of the pecuniary motive as the driving force in "progress," 
and finally, they broadened their scope again, with the world leadership 
idea as the end result of the national prestige and political power themes. 
All of these ideas, these patterns of thought, are what will be considered 
in this paper, as providing the basis for the IInew imperialism" of 1898. 
The beginning of the 189015 marked roughly the incipience of the 
tendency which, though it was probably not consciously rolated to 
7 
philosophical imperialism, did prepare the foundation for and lead to this 
ideology of 1898. Lying in the popular mood in which ideology often 
germinates, the seed of imperialism was an inclination toward two emotions 
related to the elements of imperialist ideology; namely humanitarianism and 
a belligerent spirit of national self-assertion. 
8 
The new imperialism differed from the manifest destiny of the 1840's in 
that the latter had been largely a matter of emotion. Much of it had been 
simply an expression of a half-blind faith in the superior virility of the 
American race and the superior beneficence of American political institu-
tions. l In the intervening years since the l840's, much had been done to 
provide this new emotional concept with a philosophic backing. It was not 
merely the emotion of the 1840's. The expansionists of the 1890's were 
able to cite the lessons of science and of history in support of their 
doctrine. And their reasoning and arguments carried conviction to some 
of the best minds of the period. It was this reasoning and these arguments 
that brought about a change in popular psychology that formed those 
intellectual currents or those patterns of thought underlying the "new 
imperialism. If 
Probably the idea that first had a great impact for the new expansionist 
philosophy was the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution through natural selec-
tion. Darwin t s theory of the evolution of higher lite .. forms through natural 
selection, the "suMiival of the fittest tl in the "struggle for existence," 
was easily adaptable to sociological theorizing, and his American interpreters 
lJulius Pratt, E;spa.nsionists ~ ~ (Baltimore, 1936), p. 8. 
9 
made the most of it. If a ruthless struggle for existence among individuals 
resulted in the survival and predominance of the "fittest" or biologically 
"best, II a similar struggle among races or nations might be expected to 
produce similar results. Thus Pratt concludes: " ••• ruthless inter-
national competition was justified in the name of 'progress. t ,,2 And Darwin 
himself referred specifically to the United States when he wrote: 
There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful 
progress of the United States, as well as the character of the 
people, are the results of natural selection; the more energetic, 
restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe having 
emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to that great 
countr,y, and having their succeeded best. Looking to the distant 
future, I do not think that the Rev. Zincke takes an exaggerated 
view when he says: "All other series of events -- as that which 
resulted in the culture of mind of Greece, and that which resulted 
in the empire of Rome -- only appear to have purpose and value 
when viewed in connection with, or rather as subsidiar,y to, • • • 
the great stream of Anglo-Saxon emigration to the west. 1I3 
Prominent Americans who applied Darwinian theor,y to practical conclusions 
were two popular writers, John Fiske, the historian, and Josiah Strong, a 
Congregational clergyman. 
As a devout disciple of Herbert Spencer, interested in propagating the 
theories of historical evolution and the survival of the fittest among 
nations, John Fiske was determined to show that the Anglo-Saxons in the 
United States had evolved the "fittest of all political principles -
2Julius Pratt, A History 2l United States Foreign Policy (New York, 
1955), p. 23. 
3Charles Darwin, Tile Descent of Man, and Selection .in Relation ~ SetS, I, 
p. 179. The passage quoted by Darwin is from Rev. F. B. Zincke, ~ Winter 
in ~ United States, p. 29. 
10 
federalism -- upon which all the world would at some future time be organized. 
Anglo-Saxons, he felt, excelled not only in institution but in growth of 
numbers and in economic power, and he firmly believed that because of the 
superiority of their institutions and the growth of their power, the Anglo-
Saxons were bound to lead the world. Theirs was an inevitable destiny. 
Having already spread out over two hemispheres, he felt they could not fail 
to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy first 
acquired in the settlement of America. As he said: 
It is enough to point to the general conclusion that the work 
which the English race began when it colonized North America is 
destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that 
is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become 
English in its language, in its religion, in its political habits 
and traditions, and to a predominant, extent in the blood of its 
people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race 
will trace its pedigree to F~glish fore-fathers, as four-fifths 
of the white people of the United States trace their pedigree 
today. The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from 
the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that 
sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it 
began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across 
the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts.4 
Theories of race superiority lent themselves exceedingly well to a justifica-
tion of imperialism. Foster Rhea Dulles implied that the premise of racial 
superiority was generally assumed "in support of each successive step 
toward American overseas expansion." He believed that publicists repeatedly 
pictured the United States as standing guard over western civilization. They 
urged the annexation of new territory in the Caribbean, in the Pacific, and 
off the coasts of Asia, not only in the national interest, but in behalf of 
4John Fiske~ "Manifest Destiny,11 Harper's lim! Monthly Magazine, 
LXX (March, lSS5), pp. 578-590. 
11 
the welfare of the world. 5 Thus Foster Rhea Dulles linked this racial 
superiority with the responsibility it carried with it. The theme of 
destiny, inevitable destiny, was a corollary of the theme of duty. Repeatedly 
it was declared, says Richard Hofstadter, "that expansion was the result of 
a 'cosmic tendoncy,' that destiny always arrives, that it was in the 
inexorable logic of events.,,6 The doctrine that expansion was inevitable 
had, of course, long been familiar to Americans. Manifest Destiny had often 
been invoked throughout the nineteenth century. Albert Weinberg had pointed 
out that this expression took on a new meaning in the nineties. Previously, 
destiny had meant primarily that American expansion, when we willed it, 
could not be resisted by others who might wish to stand in our way. During 
the nineticfI it came to mean that expansion "could not be resisted by 
Americans themselves, caught, willing or unwilling," in the coils ot fate.? 
Again, theirs was an inevitable destiny -- to empire -- with its concomitant 
idea of duty. 
Even more assertive in the development of such ideas was Josiah Strong. 
Strong's widely read and widely quoted ~ Countt[ had a persuasive influence. 
The Anglo-SliXon, Strong wrote, held in his hands the destinies ot mankind, 
and the United States was to become the home of this race, the principal seat 
of his power, the great center of his influence. He maintained that: 
• 
5Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise ~ World Power (New York, 1954), 
p. 32. 
6Quoted from Daniel Aaron, ed., Americ§ in Crisis (New York, 1952), 
p. 193. 
?Weinberg, p. 254. 
••• this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty of 
numbers and the might of wealth behind it -- the representative, 
let us hope: of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, 
the highest civilization -- having developed peculiarly agressive 
traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will 
spread itself over the earth. If I read not amiss, this powerful 
race Will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central a.nd ~>'outh 
America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and 
beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition 
of races will be the "survival of the fittest,,?8 
This was the "white man's burden." 
Strong's starting point was his concern with world evangelization, 
reflecting the powerful missionary impulses of this generation in American 
life. He was convinced that such evangelization was the duty of the 
Anglo-Saxon people. With their two great ideals of spiritual Christianity 
and civil liberty, they had risen by £ process of natural selection to 
world pre-eminence. 
It ~~s the unique taske of the United States, Strong further believed, 
to make certain that this expansion spread abroad American national ideals. 
12 
He felt that as custodian of the two greatest developments in human history --
civil liberty and pure spiritual Christianity -- the Anglo-Saxon was divinely 
commissioned to be, in a peculiar sense, his brother's keeper. Strong 
questioned whether there was room for reasonable doubt that the race, "unless 
devitalized by alcohol and tobacco" was destined to "dispossess many weaker 
races, assimilate others, and mold the remaining," until .. in a very true and 
important sense, it had Anglo-~axonized mankind.9 
8Josiah ~:trong, Our Country;: lli Possible Future and Its Present Crisis 
(New York, 1885), pp. 208-227. 
9 ~., p. 225. 
Religious groups throughout the nation gradually united in support of 
the imperialism of righteousness, of duty and destiny, of the "white man's 
burden." 
13 
The third and fourth background patterns of thought underlying the new 
imperialism included not only the concept of a superior race and a moral 
mission, but the traditional realistic arguments laid down by the early 
Hamiltonians in their program for overseas power. They outlined a philosophy 
of self-interest, force, and power politics. They included the ideas of 
security and of paramount interest. 
No writer had more influence in shaping this expansionism than 
Captain Alfred T. Mahan. He not only influenced public thinking by means 
of his books, innumerable articles and letters to newspapers. but also by 
close personal association with men in a position to put his ideas into 
effect. 
Mahan's historical studies on the influence of sea power. with the 
realization that new forces were invading "that little corner" which had 
previously made up the world of the United States, convinced him that "no 
nation, certainly no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy 
of isolation." And once persuaded that the United States could not live 
unto itself, Mahan preached this broader point of view unceasingly --
"whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward. ,,10 
And in The Interest of America in Sea Power. in which he urged that the 
country pursue a stronger policy that the present one of "passive self-
l<\Jilliam Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Oklahoma, 1947), pp. 77-78. 
defense," Mahan pointed out: 
All around us now is strife; the strugg~e of life, the 
race of life, are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their 
significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation 
is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others.ll 
Mahan was primarily concerned with naval power and had analyzed the 
14 
concept of this power, using England as a model. He concluded that the basic 
.. 
elements of power were trade -- including ODen markets and protected markets 
like colonies -- the ships to carr,y trade, and militar,y and naval strength 
to protect shipping and trade in time of war. His was an ambitious program 
of mercantile imperialism. Accepting the thesis that a growing volume ot 
industrial production demanded new foreign markets to maintain a healthy 
economy, Mahan insisted that in the face of existing imperialistie rivalries 
the United States had to be prepared to safeguard its commercial interests 
throughout the entire world. This meant a strong and powerful navy, tor 
only that nation which commanded the seas was in a position ot real power, 
and such a navy in turn had to have overseas bases to operate eftectively 
away from its home ports. This implied colonies, and on this subject Mahan 
maintained: 
Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to 
have. • • • Having theretore no foreign establishments, either 
colonial or military, the ships of war ot the United States, 
in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their 
llAlfred Mahan, ~ Interest .2! America in ~ POwer (Boston, 
1897), p. 18. 
own shores. To provide resting places for them, where they 
can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a 
government proposing to itself the development of the power 
of the nation at sea.12 
At this time, Mahan's ideas had special significance and meaning to 
those businessmen pushing aggressively into foreign markets. 'fhe growing 
15 
productivity of farms and factories would compel a search for foreign markets, 
as we shall see later. The competition for markets and colonies being carried 
on by the seaboard powers of Europe, especially the aggressiveness shown in 
the Pacific, in Africa, in South America, might bring these powers into 
collision with the United States. The prospective piercing of the Isthmus 
of Panama, which could create havoc for the United States in her present 
state of military and naval preparation; the very unsettled political condi-
tions rampant in Haiti, Central Amorica, and the Hawaiian Islands, places of 
great military and commercial importance, whose control also had international 
implications -- all these things could perhaps force the United States to 
abandon her usual complacency and could lead her to "look outward" and to 
build up her sea power. 
America must be reaqy in attitude and in actual preparation; hence 
Mahan sketched the outlines of his program. In addition to constructing a 
modern navy and adequate coast defenses, the United States must be ready to 
take, when opportunity offered, such outlying positions as would confer 
mastery of the essential and necessary water routes. Of special importance, 
12Alfred Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 
(Boston, 1890), p. 83. 
16 
when the isthmian canal should have been opened, would be the control of the 
Caribbean. Mahan again insisted: 
Control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy; 
secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from 
the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which 
it can exert strength. At present the positions of the Caribbean 
are occupied by foreign powers, nor may we, however disposed 
to acquisition, obtain them by means other than righteous; but 
a distinct advance will have been made when public opinion is 
convinced that we need them, and should not exert our utmost 
ingenuity to dodge them when flung at our head.13 
Mahan was also concerned with the Pacific. The United States would need 
not only the unobstructed use of the isthmian canal, but outposts in the 
Pacific as well, and the most logical outpost was in the Hawaiian Islands. 
Already in 1890 Mahan had written that for the defense of the west coast 
it was necessar,r that no foreign power acquire a lodgment in those islanda.14 
The fear or concern for foreign imperialism was constantly pushed to the fore. 
It follows then that imperialism of this kind appealed to members of 
both business and political elites as an enlargement of the sphere of American 
power or honor and profits. Many of the underdog elements also responded to 
this new note of national self assertion. This became the Ifparamount interest" 
pattern, with its national honor theme and emphasis on economic necessity. 
A directive motive in the expansion policy was demand for markets and for 
profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each 
imperial regime. The rising productivity of industr,r required larger imports 
13Alfred Mahan, tiThe United States Looking Outward," Atlantic 
Monthly, (December, 1890), pp. 102-103. 
14Ibid• 
17 
of some forme of raw materials, more imported foods for larger urban 
populations, and a great variety of imported consumption goods for a rising 
standard of living. These imports could be purchased only by a corresponding 
expansion of exports, or else by the incomes derived from foreign investments 
which implied earlier exports of capital goods. As J. A. Hoblson declared: 
It was this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and 
for investments which was avowedly responsible for the adoption of 
Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican 
party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belonged, 
and which belonged to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President· 
Theodore Roosevelt and his "manifest destiny" and "mission of 
civilization" party must not deceive us. It was Messrs. Rockfeller, 
Pierpont Morgan, and their associates who'needed Imperialism and who 
fastened it upon the shoulders of the great RepUblic of the West.15 
One aspect of American imperialism can then be seen as the natural 
product of economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which could 
not find occupation at home and needed foreign markets for goods and for 
investments. 
National interest was only one point in the arguments for expansion. 
This interest was also identified with the concern for the welfare of the 
world at large, and thus it developed into the world leadership pattern of 
thought. With her frontage on the Pacific, the United States stood guard 
over the preservation of Western civilization. But it was her role not only 
to defend but to extend the blessings of that civilization. Again Mahan's 
arguments were used, as he brought together, logically and persuasively, the 
several factors supporting an emergent imperialism. Dulles explains these 
factors as: 
l5~uoted from Theodore Greene, ed., American Imperialism in 1898 
(Boston, 1955), p. 11. 
• • • the aggressive restlessness underlying the struggle for 
survival among the great powers, the consequent necessity for the 
United States to build up predominant economic and political 
strength, and the moral responsibility of the nation to maintain 
a position which would enable it to uphold law and justice in 
international society.16 
The forces then, leading toward the move of expansionism, were very 
powerful, representing as they did what seemed to be the demands of duty 
and destiny, national security, commercial advantage, and an obligation of 
leadership, and obligation of spreading abroad American principles. Never-
18 
theless they might not have carried the day had it not been for the insistent 
propaganda of the expansionists themselves. Their skillful appeal to logic 
and emotions was of decisive importance in creating public support for 
imperialism. 
Yet it was by no means clear that the American government and public 
were really interested in foreign affairs. Press reports, editors, and 
politicians argued these controversial issues at length. In the nation 
could be heard eloquent voices attempting to stir up a crusading spirit, 
or an imperialist movement, or a revival of aggressive Anglophobia. Others 
appealed for the maintenance of isolationism. And the American literary 
magazine carried these diverse ideas and these diverse patterns of thought 
in varying degrees and with varying interpretations. The importance of 
their influence cannot be directly measured, but it seems only reasonable to 
admit that they were an important contribution in the formation of the 
American policy of supporting or reacting to the new imperialism of 1898. 
16Foster Rhea Dulles, America' s ~ .t2 World Power, 1898-1951t 
(New York, 1954), p. 33. 
CHAPTER III 
"INEVITABLJt~ DESTINY" REFLECTED IN LITERARY MAGAZINES 
7he idea of a destiny which presides over and guides American expansion 
has rarely, if ever, been absent from the national consciousness. The 
precise character of that destiny, however, as well as the ultimate goal 
to which it points, has varied with changing ideas and circumstances. At 
the close of the nineteenth century, natural destiny lay beyond continental 
U.S.A. and the triumph of this idea whether on the gro\Uld of alleged national 
interest or moral obligation, can be explained only in terms of the new 
conditions prevailing in the country at the end of the nineteenth century.l 
Specifically American expansion centered about the disposition of the 
Philippine Islands at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
To better understand the issues of the treaty debates of 1898 and 1899, 
the historian may examine the articles of Nation and Forum. 
The American belief in Manifest Destiny that gained acceptance in the 
l840's arose from an emotional sense of mission. It was the duty of America 
to furnish democratic ideals and their successful application to a world 
emerging from absolute monarchy. Thus Alexis de Tocqueville, the French 
~erle Curti, .1l.ut Growth ~ American Thought (New York, 1943), p. 667. 
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observer, noted when he wrote (in 1830's) thnt eveI1~hing concerning 
democracy showed us as a "seminal font" and elaborate laboratory.2 
In le99 the American people broke with their traditions of idealism 
as they approved acquisition of the Philippines. Expansionism carried 
them across the Pacific away from continental lI.S.A. and to a major 
strategic commitment in the Far East. The acquisition of the Philippines 
was recognized by contemporaries on both sides of the debate to be a turn-
ing point in our history. 
20 
Background events that shed much light on this final situation of the 
Philippines began on January 28, IB93, when Americans read a bulletin from 
Honolulu, Hawaii. Two weeks earlier, this news report stated, a group of 
American residents had overthrown a young native queen and formed a pro-
visional government. A Committee of Public Safety, largely composed of 
Americans, and having the support of the American Minister, Mr. Stevens, 
seized control of the government in Honolulu. Marines from the U.S.S. Boston 
had landed at the request of the American minister in order to protect lives 
and property. Violence had ended quickly. The rebels were in full control 
and were said to have enthusiastic support from the populace. Most note-
worthy of all, they had announced the intention of asking the United States 
to annex the islands. 
The proposition seemed to come unexpectedly, and neither politicians 
nor journalists knew quite what to make of it. The molders of public 
opinion seemed to be waiting to learn what mold the public wanted. 
2Alexi5 de Tocqueville, Democracv in America (London, 1946), Forward, 
xiv. 
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'!'ho press focused attention on "inevitable destiny." Magazine articles, 
congression~l debates, and public speeches, in sharp contrast with the apathy 
of the previous decade, vigorously expounded the new overseas expansionism. 
The argument for overseas expan~ion W"d.S the rrtYth of raciu.l superiority, 
derived from the evolutionary theories set forth by Charles Darwin and 
popularized by John Fiske and John Burgess. 
Fiske firmly believed that because of the superiority of their institu-
tiona and the growth of their power, the Anglo-Saxons were bound to lead 
the world by keeping that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial 
supremacy first acquired in the settlement of America. 3 It was inevitablo. 
Burgess was convinced that Anglo-Saxons were uniquely endowed with the 
capacity for establishing national states, were forordained to carry 
political institutions to all parts of the world, and consequently "must 
have a colonial policy.n4 
Editorially Nation opposed inevitable destiny. It pointed out in the 
issue of February 9, 1893, that destiny mayor could ~dso mean that the 
United States continue its past role in Hawaii because nthe situation 
heretofore has been exactly to our liking and we may well ask why it should 
be changed.,,5 
JJohn Fiske, "Manifest Destiny," Harper's Mdgazine, LXX (March, lSg5), 
pp. 578-590. 
4John ~·l. Burgess, Political ~;cience and Comparativ~ Constitutionel ~, 
I (Boston, 1891), p. 45. 
5Nation, LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75. 
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A week later the editor questioned the validity of racial destiny of 
the Social Darwinists. He implied that different races would not necessarily 
live in peace simply because the Anglo-Saxon race was exercising dominant 
control. Nation stated: 
And those who desire for the republic greater variety of races, and 
especially more color in our population, would do well, if they have 
the stomach for it, to read the account on Thursday last, of the 
burning and torture of a negro in Texas. That shocking story is a 
sufficiently awful illustration of the power of race hatred to 
convert Anglo-Saxons, at least, into rtevils incarnate. Do you want 
more material to feed this apparently unextinguishable passion?6 
There were others writing in the periodicals though who saw in the 
Anglo-Saxon race specific qualities that made it expansive. In March, 1893, 
John R. Procter, soon to be head of the Civil Service Commission, con-
tributed to The American JOUrnal ~ Politics an article which contained some 
particularly pertinent obser-,rnt.ions cClnoerning the expanBi ve qualities of 
the race. Procter believed that the Anglo-Saxons who came from Britain 
were lithe most adventurous, the most restless descendants of that hardy 
rover race." Discussing the "restless" march of Anglo- Saxondom he asked: 
Will not the same spirit that brought the Norse sea rovers 
to that beautiful Britain and sent their descendants worldward 
from that island home, carry the aggressive Anglo-Saxons of the 
Greater Britain, inheriting the same Teutonic greed for land, with 
the aggressive colonization instincts and assimilating forces 
intensified; with a love of adventure and of gain, and an adaptabil-
ity of commerce -- will not these forces, more potent than written 
laws, force American enterprise to look more and more, as we 
grow stronge7 and richer, beyond the limits of our own territorial restriction. 
6Ibid., (February 9, 1893), p. 93. 
7"The Nicaragua Canal, II The American Journal of Politics, II 
(March, 1893), p. 231. 
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And Ih! Review 2!. Reviews, in June, 1893, commenting editorially upon 
the frequency of revolutions and wars in the Latin American countries, 
observed that it seemed as though these countries with their large mixture 
of Indian blood "were determined to kill themselves off in order that 
their land might become the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon or some other stable 
race with capacity for industrial development and social order. ,,8 
Nation did not concur with the policy of "inevitable If annexation on 
any grounds but pointed out the effect this "general readiness to subjugate 
and dominate or control outside this continent would have on our domestic 
institutions. ,,9 
As the Hawaiian issue approached the time of decision, Mahan entered 
the propaganda campaign. He looked upon the Hawaiian question as important 
both in itself and in the precedent it would create. He prepared for the 
Forum an article which appeared late in February, 1893. Mahan took for his 
postulate the concept that growth is a vital necessity to a nation. Cessation 
of growth amounts to stagnation and decay. He asserted the "inevitable 
destiny" of the United States to expansion when he wrote: 
In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried 
our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; today maturity sees us upon the 
Pacific. Have we no right or no call to progress farther in any 
direction? • • • This is the question that has long been looming upon 
the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. Of it the 
Hawaiian incident is a part -- intrinsically, perhaps, a small part, 
but in its relations to the whole, so vital that, as has been said, 
a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only 
in principle, but in fact, recession along the whole line. 
8.lh!, Review.2! Review!, VII (June, 1893), p. 523. 
9Nation (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174. 
And then Mahan very pointedly continued: 
In our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are here come 
into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of 
whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has 
wrought mightily in the past and in the present is visible by 
recurring manifestations. lO 
Later in the same article, Mahan again reiterated his plea for under-
standing that this anneYAtion of Hawaii was part of the natural destiny of 
the United States. He asserted: 
This is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possible, 
just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy, 
fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness 
of our national progress, the time has now arrived. The principle 
being accepted, to be conditioned only b,y a just and candid regard 
for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations. • • 
the annexation even of Hawaii, would be no mere sporadic effort, 
irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first 
fruit and a token +:.hat the nation in its evolution haa arou.sed itself 
to the necessity of carrying its life -- that has been the happiness 
of those under its influence -- teyond the borders that have hereto-
fore sufficed for its activities.ll 
The article opened a series,12 all directed to the theme of growth and 
the inevitability of decay if the growth is retarded. The article was on 
the stands by February, though it was in the March number. 
Mahan's position was promptly challenged by Cooley. Was there even a 
constitutional warrant for the acquisition of such outlying possessions? 
Judge T. M. Cooley, formerly a member of the Michigan Supreme Court and of 
the Interstate Commerce Com~isBion wrote in Forum also, and argued that 
lOAlfred T. Mahan, IIHawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, X.v 
(March, 1893), p. 2. 
11 ~., p. 7 
later issued in his book, 1h! Interest of America 
1897) • 
25 
there was not this constitutional warrant, and he did not consider this 
acquisition either destiny or duty. wbile the constitution itself imposed 
no limit upon the treaty-making power, that power, he reasoned, was in reality 
limited by the conditions under which the Constitution was made and the 
purpose of its makers; and the founding fathers, he was sure, had in mind 
neither states nor territories of non-homogeneous people, nor the erection 
of a colonial system. As he said: 
Now outlying colonies are not within the contemplation of the United 
States at all. The structure of government created under it never had 
in view such colonies and the people of the United States would never 
have consented to provide for our holding them. • •• This proposed 
treaty is not only one that will constitute a precedent for uniting 
ourselves to any country on the globe, but it is one that will justify 
our annexing other countries regardless of the differences of race 
and of the discordant elements that might be brought into the Union 
by the act. • •• The Constitution was made for the government of 
the United States of America, and not of countries in different parts 
of the world. It was not made and shaped for the establishment of 
any colonial system. l ) 
An important point, however, is that those who used the argument of 
"inevitable destiny" sought to create the impression that certain events 
were fated to take place, that whether good or evil they were bound to 
occur. Actually the argument was usually employed to take all cases, good 
or evil, out of the realm of human volition. That this argument had its 
effect is demonstrated by the observation made in another periodical, the 
Atlantic Monthly, by an opponent of the absorption by the United States 
of the countries of Latin America, that lIif destiny condemns us to absorb 
l)nlOmas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation," Forum, 
XV (June, 189), pp. 393-396. 
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them ••• the longer the day is postponed the better for us. ,,14 Such 
absorption was felt to be wrong, but it was also feared that the United States 
might be compelled by destiny to carr,r it out. 
There were other references to the idea of inevitability in the 
periodicals during this period. Henry Pratt Judson, a.t the time, Dean of 
the Colleges at the University of Chicago and later its president, in the 
Review S11. Reviews" March, 1893, argued that the United States could no longer 
remain isolated and that it "cannot help being one of the foremost states 
even if it would. ,,15 Similarly, a writer in the Political Science Quarterly 
observed that after the Hawaiian revolution of 1893 the Unlted States 
"awoke to the fact that perhaps in spite of ourselves and our national 
prejudices the logic of events had extended our zone of political influence 
far beyond our supposed definitive boundaries.,,16 
Cone;ressmen, Senators, and reporters spoke of many diverse reasons 
either in support of or opposing expansion, or more specifically annexation 
of Hawaii. There was talk that Grover Cleveland, the incoming President, 
wanted Hawaii and also wanted Canada and the West Indies. Thomas F. Bayard, 
Secretary of State in Cleveland's first term, said Hawaii should become 
America's. r:·ome members of the party remained suspicious, but as the adminis~ 
tration prepared to send a treaty to the Senate, reporters judged that it 
14Browne , "Latin and Saxon America," Atlantic Monthly, LXIV, p. 840. 
l5ffAmerican Politics: A Study of Four Careers (Blaine, Lamar, Hayes, 
Butler), II Reviel-l of Reviews, VII (March, 1893), p. 160. 
l6Robert N. Keely, M.D., "Nicaragua and the Mosquito Coast," Political 
Science {,Guarterly, XLV (June, 1894), p. 160. 
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would be ratified by more than the necessary two-thirds vote. 
Cleveland personally intervened with a request that the Senate defer 
action and give him time to study the matter. Since the President-elect 
did not even intimate that he would oppose annexation, both Democrats and 
Republicans acquiesced. 
The new President decided that scrutiny of the question would require 
some time. He withdrew the treaty and sent a commissioner to Hawaii to 
gather data and to survey opinion among the native population. Eventually, 
with the report of James H. Blount, the agent whom he had sent to Hawaii, 
and with Walter Gresham, his new Secretary of State, he drafted a Presiden-
tial statement declaring not only that annexation should be renounced, but 
that justice called for redressing the wrong by at least an apology to the 
Queen, together with a quick effort to persuade the revolutionaries that 
they should restore her. 
This caused a great deal of speculation and conflict on the part of 
annexationists and anti-annexationists. The blossoming imperialist move-
ments probably lost their force for a time. As Ernest May wrote: "From 
the beginning, it had been moralistic as well as imperialist. While leaders 
like Lodge, Frye, and Morgan spoke of security, advantage, and gain, many 
editors, and most clergymen used words like 'duty,' I destiny,' and 
~ 
'mission. ,"17 
l7Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (New York, 1961), p. 23. 
Albert Shaw, the youthful editor of the popular American Review 2! 
Reviews, wrote in 1893 of America's past failure to seek colonies as a 
"policy more selfish and. timid than it was broad and enlightened." After 
annexation had come to seem unlikely, he described the great powers as 
"watching ••• with a l!Iomewhat puzzled and bewildered but also a very alert 
and fixed attention" and urged Congress to exhibit a "sense of the national 
dignity and the national destiny."lS 
Meanwhile, Nation had been praising President Cleveland for his 
cautious policy, compliment.ing Mr. Blount for his carefully prepared legal 
case, and maintaining that annexation was not the inevitable destiny of 
the United States, but only an unreasonable act being forced by a few 
individuals and groups. 
In an editorial of December, 1893, Nation angrily retorted that there 
was much discussion in the Senate about the President not keeping it in-
formed about matters in Hawaii, and then continued: 
But not one word was said in the debate as to what a President should 
do when an unauthorized act of war has been committed in a foreign 
country by a representative of the Unlted States, and. a legitimate 
representative government thereby overthrown •••• This is exactly 
what has happened in Hawaii. • • • Has the President under the 
Constitution no power to undo wrongs committed in foreign countries 
without authority by his officers or agents? Somebody ought to 
answer this question.19 
l8Review 2! Reviews, VII (April, 1893), p. 116. 
19Nation, LVII (December 14, 1893), p. 439. 
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Some weeks later Nation denounced the annexation of Hawaii, which, is 
maintained, may come about eventually, not because of inevitable destiny, 
but simply as a result of force and manueverings. Nation very strongly 
stated: 
The Hawaiian annexationists have scored a great point in getting the 
'Portuguese colony' to come out strongly for annexation to the United 
States. This was accomplished in a mass meeting of that colony held 
on February 19, when stirring resolutions were passed to that effect. 
As there are 8,602 Portuguese in the islands, 6,276 of whom cannot 
read and write, the importance of this accession to the annexation 
cause will be apparent. 20 
In May, 1894, Forum, at one point, praised the handling by the admin-
ietration of the Hawaiian case, while in another article, S. M. Cullom, 
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taking inventory of the administration's policy and finding it lacking, felt 
it inevitable to extend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of this nation. 
He said: 
The entire country had cheerfully and patriotically concurred in 
the wisdom and Americanism of the foreign policy of the retiring 
administration, and from Cape Cod to the Seal Islands not a 
dissentient syllable was heard in regard to the cherished proposition 
of President Harrison's administration peacefully to extend the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of this Republic over the waiting 
population of the beautiful islands of the western sea. 21 
Henry Cabot Lodge, in the March issue of the Forum, strongly supported 
and maintained the inevitable destiny of the United States. "There is a very 
definite policy for American statesmen to pursue in this respect if they 
would prove themselves worthy inheritors of the principles of Washington 
2ONation, LVIII (March 22, 1894), p. 204. 
2lWilliam E. Russell, "A Year of Democratic Administration, II Forum, 
XVII (May, 1894), p. 268. 
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and Adams." He further asserted that there may be no extens:!.on to the 
South, but from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean, there should be one flag 
and one country, that the United States should build the Nicaragua canal, 
should control the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, and Cuba -- all this for the 
interests and destiny of the United Statea.22 
In a following issue of Forum, George Bourinot challenged Lodge's 
"inevitable destiny" including Canada. He answered that Canadians did 
not favor annexation and that a change in the ~stem and method of their 
government \iou1d not be conducive to the liberty and happiness of the 
Canadian people. He then showed how the Canadian government, politics, 
and economic system, were very effective and even more GO than the United 
States. 23 
Nation had also disagreed with Lodge's article in Forum. It was 
cynical of his reasoning, and of his "kindergarten methods of instruction," 
and it laughed at his "Americanism" and national duty idea. 24 
In early 1895, the headlines had proclaimed the new revolution in 
Cuba, a war for independence, and throughout the island small armed bands 
struck at Spanish garrisons and roads and railroad lines. The United States 
reacted instinctively against Spain. 
22 Henry Cabot Lodge, flOur Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, XIX. 
(March, 1895), p. 16. 
23George Bourinot, lrV\by Canadians Do ~lot Favor Annexation," Forum, 
XIX. (May, 1895), p. 27P.. 
24Nation, LX (March 14, 1895), p. 191. 
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In most American eyes, the rebels were fighting for an independent 
republic and for such American-patent blessings as free enterprise, free 
schools, and free churches. Even the most isolationist American newspapers, 
such as the New York Evening ~, the Springfield Republican, and the 
Boston Transcript, expressed hope that the Cubans would succeed. It was 
at this time that many newspapers became voluntary propaganda organs for 
the Cubans. Sensation-mongering papers like William Randolph Hearst' Band 
Joseph Pulitzer's later dispatched special correspondents to vie with shock-
ing accounts of Spanish atrocities. 
In an editorial, Nation severely criticized the United States policy 
of "manifest destiny" in Cuba by referring to the illiterate population. 
It stated: 
How easy it is for Spain -- how easy it would be for the United 
States if Lodge and Frye had their piratical way -- to make Cuba 
a model of self-government and political purity, may be seen by a 
glance at the nature of the population •••• Illiteracy mounts up 
to alarming proportions: 76 percent of the population can neither 
read nor write •••• From all this it can be inferred hoW' ripe Cuba 
is for independence and republican institutions, especially how 
ready to become a state in our Union. What delightful colleagues 
for Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba furnish •••• With 
hearts beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other 'good things' 
in sight, they would seem to be fore-ordained to seats in the Senate; 
and Senator Proctor's objections to receiving them must be set down 
to advancing age, the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manifest 
destiny. 25 
Nation, in October, 1895, commenting upon Captain Mahan's article, 
liThe Future in Relation to American Naval PoW'er,,,26 again struck a blow 
25Nation, LX (April 25, 1895), p. 320. 
26Harpqr's ~ Monthly Magazine, XCI (October, 1895), p. 774. 
at the idea of inevitability. It refused to accept the determinism or 
the inevitability implied, and was sharply critical of Mahan for speaking 
"again and again of the development of the nation and of national sentiment 
as a 'natural force,' moving on to its desired end, unconscious and 
unmoral. ,,27 
In a conment on Murat Halstead's book, The Stoty .2! ~, as having 
value as the report of a newspaper correspondent who has recently visited 
Cuba, Nation again referred to the "destiny" idea. 
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To our mind, Mr. Halstead' 8 facts destroy the arguments suggested by 
political fancy. The argument from tfdestiny," however, is unanswerable, 
and always has been to those who believe in it. Cuba belongs by destiny 
to the United States, just as Canada and Mexico do, to say nothing ot 
South America; it is also part of destiny that the present owners of 
these countries should vigorously resist parting with them, so that 
it will probably be centuries before destiny is accomplished satis-
factorily to all parties. Newspaper correspondents, however, occupy 
themselves much with the future, and we are glad to know troJIl 
Mr. Halstead that it will all tum out all right in the end. 2B 
Forum also presented an article on the Itinevitable destiny" theme. 
w. G. Sumner, Professor of Social and Political Science at Yale University 
wrote on the fallacy of territorial expansion in the June Forum. He 
explained that the traditional belief is that a state aggrandizes itself 
by territorial extension, so that winning new land is gaining in wealth 
and prosperity. He maintained that there is such a thing, though, as an 
expedient size for a state and that the notion that gain of territory is 
gain of wealth and strength for the state, after the expedient size has 
27Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 235. 
28Nation, LXII (June 25, 1896), p. 496. 
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been won, is a delusion4 He continued his explanation, that if the United 
States should admit Hawaii to the Union, the Fiscus of the former state 
would collect more taxes and incur more expenses. The circumstances are 
such that the latter would probably be the greater. But, with Cuba, he 
said, if we were compelled to take the jurisdiction and establish order 
and security there, it would be a great burden and possibly a fatal calamity 
to us. Sumner then concluded: 
This confederated state of ours was never planned for indefinite 
expansion, or for an imperial policy. • • • The Fathers of the 
Republic planned a confederation of free and peaceful industrial 
commonwealths, shielded by their geographical position from the 
jealousies, rivalries, and traditional policies of the Old World. • • • 
Any extension will not make us more secure where we are, but will 
force us to take new measures to secure our new acquisitions. The 
preservation of acquisitions will force us to reorganize our internal 
resources, so as to make it possible to prepare them in advance and 
to mobilize them with promptitude. This will lessen liberty and 
require discipline. It will increase taxation and all the pressure 
of government. • • • All this will be disastrous to repUblican 
institutions and to democracy.29 
This expansionism and imperialism then, according to Professor Sumner, 
is not necessarily "inevitable destiny" or duty for the United States, but 
could actually do more harm than good. 
There was much controversy over annexing lands with peoples of varied 
nationalities, customs, and language. Could this really be "manifest 
destiny"? 
Hon. John R. Proctor, President of the United States Civil Service 
Commission believed this was perfectly natural and inevitable when he said: 
29W• G. Sumner, "The Fallacy of Territorial 
(June, 1896), pp. 414-419. 
Extension, II Forum, XXI 
,~\ 
LOYOLA \';" 
Having annexed possessions of France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia --
with their alien peoples, customs, and laws -- and with ease in-
corporated them into our system, we care little whether there are 
a few thousand more or less Orientals now in Hawaii. If this be 
an evil, with annexation, it will prove a diminishing one: without 
annexation it may become incurable. 
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Proctor then went on to declare more forcefully the logic and inevitableness 
of this manifest destiny, when he continued in Forum: 
The founders of our government understood that it was devised to 
facilitate annexation of territor.y; and our past history has settled 
that question. • • • Every acquisition of territory since the forma-
tion of our government has been opposed by men who seem to have had 
little appreciation of the manifest destiny of our race: others 
shrink with fear, lest we have not the ability to administer properly 
the government of countries seeking admission into our system. 30 
Murat Halstead, in an article in the same issue of Forum, returned to 
the natural destiny of the United States when he spoke of Cuba and said: 
It has been the plain common se~se of history that, as Spain lost by 
her colonial system of regarding outlying possessions crown property, 
and ruling them by martial law so she must lose Cuba in the same way. 
There is no escaping the law and logic of history. If she has not 
lost the island already it is only a question of time when she will 
do so. And then the United States must accept the duties of destiny.3l 
Later in the article, Murat again implied the inevitability of the 
destiny of the United States to expand and change, when he said that we be 
everlasting examples. Thomas Jefferson saw that if the Constitution was 
not equal to the occasion of the absorption of the Louisiana purchase, there 
was a higher and a more fundamental law -- "our inheritance -- written over 
3~on. John R. Proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," 
Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), pp. 43, 45. 
3lMurat Halstead, 'tAmerican Annexation and Armament," Forum, XXIV 
(September, 1897), p. 60. 
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the continent, in rivers and ranges of mountains, in plains and valleys, and 
that therefore, the Constitution would have to be accommodating. No parch-
ment can forbid the march of mankind. 1132 
In an editorial of December, 1897, Nation referred to Mr. Bryce's 
article in the December Forum. Nation approved of the objection of Mr. Bryce 
to annexing Hawaii because of the difficulty of governing such a country and 
especially such a population. Mr. Bryce had also said: liThe policy of 
creating great armaments and of annexing territories beyond the sea would 
be. • • an un-American policy, and a complete departure from the maxims -
approved by long experience - of the illustrious founders of the Republic.,,33 
And Nation tried to strengthen the argument by commenting: 
Now the first thing that confronts us when we done to this 'mere 
matter of detail' ••• is the fact that the Hawaiian Government 
confesses that the inhabitants of the islands are not capable of 
governing themselves. If this is true ••• it is, or ought to be, 
a fatal bar to annexation. The theory of our government, from the 
Ordinance of 1787 down, has been that the expansion of the United 
States was to be solely by the addition of self-governing communities 
to self-governing communities. J4 
This annexation then again, is not inevitable but contrary to American 
principles and ideals. 
Both Forum and Nation in March, 1898, referred to the duty of the 
United States in regard to its relations with Cuba and Spain. Talk of 
32Ibid., p. 65. 
33Rt • Hon. James Bryce t liThe Policy of Annexation for America," Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), p. 395. 
J4Nation, LXV (December 2, 1897), p. 432. 
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war and the growing bellicosity of many caused one last effort to be made 
in a plea to consider the real consequences of duty. 
Senator H. D. Money in Forum, commenting on the impossible conditions 
that were demanded as necessary precedents to the recognition of Cuban 
belligerency, felt that the whole character of the war precluded the 
fulfillment of any of those conditions. He concluded by again appealing 
to our destiny and duty when he wrote: "But a recognition of belligerency 
would not accomplish our measure of duty in this matter. • • • If we look 
to our duty, we cannot be indifferent to her fate. The example of insurrec-
tion a.gainst oppression was sat by us.,,35 
And Nation, in its one final plea stated: 
He [the President] should bear in mind, too, that a war which the 
conscience of the nation does not heart.ily support, a war which leaves 
a doubt in the mind of Christian men and women whether it is right 
for us to engage in it, is particularly unwise and dangerous. The 
enthusiasm which the first smell of gunpowder creates will be a very 
feeble reliance unless it is sustained by the conviction or substantial 
citizens that we are following an imperative call to duty; that we 
have weighed the consequences, and that we have well considered what 
we are to do after we shall have successfully intervened in Cuba and 
assumed the resnonsibility of governing it.3b 
This would not seem to be tlinevitable destiny" by Nation. But 
imperialists believed that every expansion of our territory was in 
accordance with the irresistible law of growth, with its "inevitable destiny." 
35Senator H. D. Money, "Our Duty to Duha," Forum, XXV (March, 1898), 
p. 18. 
36Nation, LXVI (March 17, 1898), p. 199. 
CHAPTER IV 
IDEA OF "WHITE MAN'S BURDEN" 
AS SEEN IN LITERARY MAGAZINES 
Along with the ideas of racism and destiny that ap!)eared in the 
wri tings of the philosophers of expansion was the idea of mission. "'!'he 
doctrine of mission," ea.ys Ralph Henry Gabriel, flis a rationalization which 
provides a philosophical justification for national and racial pride."l 
Frederick Merk wrote: "A truer expression of the national spirit was Mission. 
This was present from the beginning of American history and is present, 
clearly, today •••• Its language was that of dedication -- dedication to 
the enduring values of American civilization. ,,2 
Burgess, too, felt that altruistic thought -- that the abilities of 
the Anglo-Saxons were too valuable to be kept at home. Burgess felt that 
by far the large part of the surface of the globe was inhabited by popula-
tions which had not succeeded in establishing civilized states, and since 
there is no human right or barbarism, the Teutonic nations were called to 
carry the political civilizations of the modern world into those parts of 
l~ Course g! American Democratic Thought: !n Intellectual History 
Since 1815 (New York; 1940), p. 344. 
2 Frederick Merk, Manifest Destinz ~~ssion (New York, 1963), p. 261. 
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the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races. They must have a 
colonial policy, and this, Burgess felt, was a matter not only of right but 
of duty.J 
Thus the expansion of the United States into backward and misgoverned 
areas, which Fiske and Strong had seen as destiny, took on, in Burgess's 
teaching, the character of an obligation to civilization, an altruistic 
characteristic and motive. 
Another spokesman for this idea of mission was Josiah Strong, who 
adopted the ideas of the Social Darwinists and elaborated them in a notable 
chapter in Q\n: Country: .lli Possible Future Jm..<i Its Present Crisis. The 
38 
idealism of his message, which emphasized the historic mission of the Anglo--
Saxon people, to implant in all the remote areas of the earth, the great 
values of civil liberty and spiritual Christianity, was bound to appeal to 
the moral sentiments of many Americans. Religious groups throughout the 
nation gradually united behind the "imperialism of righteousness." 
As Strong said: lilt is time to dismiss 'the craven fear of being 
great,' to recognize the place in the world which God has given us and to 
accept the responsibilities which it devolves upon us in behalf of 
Christian civilization. ,.4 
One of the dominant themes of the doctrine of mission as it appeared 
in the periodicals was the viewpoint that this country had a mission to 
JAs explained by Julius Pratt, A History 2! United States foreign Policy 
(New York, 1955), p. 68. 
4Josiah Strong, Expansion Under ~ World Conditions (New York, 1900), 
p. 295. 
further the cause of peace. This argument was, of course, also often used 
in connection with the ideas of race and destiny, and the frequency of its 
appearance in the literature of expansionism is evidence of the need that 
was felt to clothe expansionism in the raiment of moral respectability • 
. 
Perhaps because of the powerful strain of Puritanism that was, and to a 
considerable degree still is, part of the American character, the American 
felt it necessary to find moral justification for his actions and the 
actions of his country. Thus the idea of an American mission to preserve 
or promote peace had a strong appeal. 
The Review g!. Reviews, May, 1894, declared that the United States had 
a duty in the Pacific and in the Orient to open these areas to the Occident 
and also to protect the weak against the strong. Furthermore, the whole 
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world would approve this step and "would welcome the Stars and Stripes as 
the emblem of peace and good will toward all mankind in the North Pacific. "5 
Even though the idea of mission, "white man's burden," was probably 
the most benevolent of the expansionist concepts, it was at times expressed 
in connection with theories far removed from peace and justice. Writing 
in the American Journal g! Politics, Ethan Allen, grandson of the Revolution-
ary War leader, advocat.ed what he called the "right of political domain." 
Under this right, said Allen, the United States could appropriate any 
territory it needed. The United States would pay a fair price but refusal 
to sell would mean confiscation. This rule, claimed Allen, would be 
enforced "for the benefit of all mankind, since this nation is today the 
5Review g!. Reviews, IX (May, 1894), p. 515. 
world t s almoner of the liberties our fathers gained. ,,6 It was" of course, 
an expression of mission similar in its innnorality t.o the utterances of 
Burgess and Mahan. The arrogance of such statements prompted the Nation, 
in October" 1895, to refer sarcastically to those who "in fine Hegelian 
phrases" claim that the United States has international dutieo as well as 
international rights, and who declare that the nation is "preparing to go 
forth with lofty benevolence" like a Knight of the Round Table, to redress 
wrongs and establish justice the world over. ,,7 
In regard to the public, readiness to react to the Hawaiian and Cuban 
situations can be understood in part through the displacement of feelings 
of ~pathy or social protest generated in domestic affairs; these impulses 
found a. safe and satisfying release in foreign conflict. HaWF.ii needed 
the help of the United States" and it was from this altruistic motive that 
the United States wanted to come to her aid. Spain was waging a heartlesD 
and inhuman war, the Cubans were portrayed as noble .... 'ictims of Spanish 
tyranny, and again it was the United States that must unselfishly come to 
the aid of the Cuban people. This was the "white man t s burden. It 
Both Nation and Forum alluded to this altruistic motive. In an 
editorial in the February 9, 1893 issue, Nation did not consider it altru-
istic when one realized the inferior type of person that would come into 
the governing body of the United States if Hawaii were annexed. Nation 
stated: 
6110ught We To Annex Cuba?" American Journal g! Politics, VII 
(July, 1895), p. 48. 
7Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234. 
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The population now consists of natives recentljT emerged from savagery, 
speaking foreign tongues, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese •••• 
The State Government would almost inevitably fall into the hands of 
a Sugar Boss or of some other great speculator, who would fill the 
Legislature tdth its own creature, and cause his own election to the 
Senate in company with the kind of subordinate known as a "Me-too." 
The best mode undoubtedly seems to be the mode now in operation --
that is, a simple protectorate.8 
The United States then, had no obligation to "take care tl of, or 
evangelize these poor inhabitants of Hawaii, and Thomas Cooley, in an 
article in Forum, felt it would be more altruistic of the United States to 
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remain out of the affairs of Hawaii. He did not feel that the United States 
manifested true interest in the people of Hawaii when they made no attempt 
to ascertain the wishes of the native population about the subject of annexa-
tion, nor of anyone else, except those who participated in the revolution. 9 
Nation agre~d with Cooley in his view. In an editorial commenting on 
the filibustering message and treaty submitted to the Senate by the 
President in the Hawaiian matter, Nation said that the recommendation 
about the islands had been made by the "plenipotentiaries" who represented 
the "merest fraction of the inhabitants, whose wishes had not been mani-
fested by a plebiscite or even consulted. Life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, will for them, be who~ly at the mercy of despots seated 
either at Washington or at Honolulu. 1I10 
8NationJ LVI (February 9, 1893), p. 96. 
9Thomas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, It Forum, 
XV (June, 1893), p. 390. 
10Nation, LVI (February 23, 1893), p. 136. 
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Nation followed this same theme in another editorial t when it stated: 
As a friend of the India.n, therefore, as one who does not contemn the 
Chinese and who does have an honest respect for solemn treaty obliga-
tions even w.tth an "inferior" civilization, and who could not personally 
do a mean act to the humblest of the Hawaiian aborigines, we hope 
President Cleveland will study the proposal in the light of American 
republican principles and of the nature of peace and war. Is it con-
sistent to incorporate another people without a plebiscite; or having 
taken a plebiscite, straightway to disinfranchise the majority of those 
who participate in it? Is it lawful to go to war for this purpose? 
Or is it altruistic to force one's policies on another people? Nation very 
pointedly and cleverly commented on Mr. Blrnlnt being sent for the investiga-
tion. It continued: "He actually plans to visit all the islands and 
employ several weeks in finding out the real sentiment of the people." 
Nation then concluded: 
It was evidently a great mistake to send a man of such plodd.ing 
methods, wh3n there were available as commissioners men of lightning-
like minds, such as that of the ex-officer of the navy who told a 
reporter that the "nine hours" he spent in Honolulu thoroughly 
convinced him that the Hawaiians to a man were in favor of annexation. 11 
There was no altruistic motive, it would seem, a.ccording to Nation, for 
Minister Steven's work, as early as November, 1889, to get ready to haul 
up the flag and to force annexation. "His dispatches, from his earliest 
arrival on the islands, show that he was true to the Blaine tradition ot 
diplomacy, for he set to work at once interesting himself in the material 
resources and possibilities of the country, looking for chances to get in 
on the ground floor, tor channels of usefulness and for good things 
generally. ,,12 And Nation implied that his meant "good things" for the 
United States, not the people of Hawaii. 
Nation considered universal suffrage an important condition in the 
altruistic motive, when in its editorial, it referred to the Tribune's 
allusion to a certain "free and intelligent people" in Hawaii, whom this 
wicked administration is forcing to submit to "a corrupt, idolatrous, and 
barbarous despotism. If Nation regretted that the Tribune did not say of 
what this "free and intelligent II people consisted. It hoped it was not 
possible that it consisted of the 637 white Americans resident in the 
capital in a total registered vote of 13,593, and that the term excluded 
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the bulk of the population simply because they were native-born and colored. 
Nation continued: 
If this should prove true, we should all die of shame. • • • We 
take it for granted that the Tribune means the native born citizens 
of Hawaii, without distinction of race or color, and that it is 
under the impression, formed through misleading reports, that they 
are furiously opposed to the ~ueen's government and would overthrow 
it but for Secretary Gresham and Mr. Blount. When it learns the 
true state of the case, it will come round, and will denounce the 
prejudice against color just as we do, and demand an equal voice in 
the government for the colored Hawaiians as it does for the colored 
Americans.13 
This alone would be the "white man's burden" toward the Hawaiian people, 
according to Nation. A truly altruistic act on Congress's part in dealing 
with the Hawaiian problem would be the taking of a popular vote. Altruism 
does not allow, Nation stated: 
l2Ibid., (May 11, 1893), p. 338. 
l3Nation, LVII (November 16, 1893), p. 359. 
• • • the policy ot allowing a handtul ot white traders to set up 
a government without consulting the main body ot the people. • • • 
[It] would be strongly condemned by both parties, and especially 
by the kepuhlican party arrayed against a popular vote on account 
ot the color ot the bulk ot the voters, seeing that it was it which 
embodied in our Constitution that tamous clause which says that the 
right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United Sta.tes 
or any State, on account ot race, color, or any previous condition 
ot servitude. fl14 
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Nation continued this line ot thought in an editorial in a later issue. 
It again reterred to the illiteracy ot the people ot Cuba and then implied 
how Cuba was thus not ready tor independence, republican institutions, or 
tor becoming a State in the Union. Nation continued: "What delightful 
colleagues tor Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba turnish1 With 
heart beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other good things in sight, 
they would seem to be toreordained to seats in the Senate; and Senator 
Proctor's objections to receiving them MUst be set down to advancing age, 
the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manitest destiny.II15 Nation thus 
linked its reaction against the imperialists' ideas of "manifest destiny" 
with its reaction against their understanding of "White man's burden." 
The anti-imperialist, like the imperialist, was interested less in inter-
national humanitarianism than in his own nation. The concern was always in 
regard to what effect this imperial policy would have upon the country, 
this joining of peoples so unlike those of the United States, this racial 
disqualification for selt-government. 
14Ibid., (December 14, 1893), p. 443. 
l5Ibid., LX (April 25, 1895), p. 320. 
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The Hawaiian "failure" was not, according to Nation, that the President's 
plan of undoing the wrong committed in t.he name of the Government had fa.iled, 
or that the provisional government of Hawaii was still in power, and that 
the (.lueen was still deprived of the throne from which she had been pushed by 
an illegal use of United States forces. But the plan that really failed, 
stated Nation, was that we did not: 
• • • express our national love of justice and regard for the weak and 
wronged. • • • If anything has failed, it has been the simple purpose 
of the President to carry out a fundamental principle of Christianity. 
But it is of the nature of a fine and just action that its merit and 
real success reside in the intention, not in the execution. • • • When 
the history of this Hawaiian affair comes to be written, atter the 
partisan clamor has died out, it will be seen that Mr. Cleveland struck 
a fine note of patriotism and justice.16 
Nation praised Senator Proctor as a man for good Americans to keep 
their eyes on, as he did not agree with Lodge, Frye, and Cullom in hoping 
for a war with Spain so that "we may have an opportunity to annex Cuba." 
Nation then very cleverly and with heavy sarcasm explained; 
The character of the population, he [Senator Proctor] adds, is not 
such as he would consider desirable in a State of the Union, and a 
State Cuba would necessarily become, he thinks, if annexed. Now it 
is hard to sit down with a United States Senator and point out to 
him what Lodge says every intelligent schoolboy knows. • • • Does not 
Mr. Proctor know that intense Americans never ask how we are to govern 
distant islands and mongrel races after we get them? • • • Besides, 
does not Mr. Proctor know what the instantaneous effect of American 
institutions upon alien peoples is certain to be? Can he not see 
them becoming, at first contact with our politics, industrious and 
sober studeniA of the constitution, enemies of corruption, good 
Republicans? ·f 
l6Ibid., LVIII (February 8, 1894), p. 97. 
l7Ibid., LX (March 28, 1895), p. 229. 
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Nation thus ridiculed the so-called 'Iwhite man's burden" taken on by 
Lodge and Frye and Cullom and President Harrison. Nation considered proper 
government of the islands part of the "white man' s burden." 
In regard to the uprising in Cuba, Clarence King, in an article in 
Forum, held that it was the duty of the United States to make a decision to 
help either Spain or Cuba, and then concluded that it was our "burden" to 
decide only one way. 
Our record toward Spain is clear. • • • Is it difficult for us to 
decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling over-
board Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs, and which our 
treaty with Spain cannot prevent? Which cause is morally right? -
Which is manly? -- Which is American?lS 
Nation also referred to the Spanish tyranny in Cuba, but it did not 
agree with King's conclusion. Nation cited some of the oppression and 
tyranny in taxes, customs, and duties, but then explained that the admin-
ietration of Cuba had distinctly improved in the last thirty years; and 
that the men responsible for the idea that Spain was a cruel monster were 
simply outsiders with no real interest in the people of Cuba. Nation felt 
it was not the "burden" of the United States to interfere in Cuban affairs 
because "the great mass of property owners and business men see their 
truest interest in the continuance of Spanish control.,,19 
Henry Cabot Lodge's conception of the "sacred trust" apparently 
resolved itself into the moral principle that the welfare of the heathen 
l8C1arence King, "Shall Cuba Be Free?" Forum, XX (September, 1895), 
p. 319. 
19Nation, LX (April 25, 1895), p. 319. 
is sacred. The crowning element in Lodge's moral philosophy was a doctrine 
of the "burden. 'I In speaking of the duty of the United States to Cuba, in 
an article in Forum, Lodge stated his viewpoint when he wrote: 
That which makes action imperative on the part of the United States 
in regard to Cuba, rests on a higher ground than any of these. Such 
a war as is now being waged in Cuba - unrestrained by any of the 
laws of civilized warfare and marked by massacre and ferocious 
reprisals at every step -- is a disgrace to civilization. • • • 
The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand 
the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an 
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end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence •••• 
We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it •••• 
If one Administration declines to meet our national responsibilities 
as they should be met, there will be put in power another Administration 
which will neither neglect nor shun its plain duty to the United States 
and to the cause of freedom and humanity.20 
John Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law at Columbia University, 
did not agree with Lodge in his plea for the Cubans, as to the duty and burden 
of the United States to the cause of humanity. He did not approve recog-
nizing Cuban belligerency, did not teel it would benefit the Cuban ineur-
gents. He also pictured the illiterate population, the undeveloped politi-
cal capacity, and the tendency of the people for constant wars and revolu-
tions. It was not the burden of the United States to aid them, because, as 
he said: 
These facts. • • furnish matter tor serious reflection as to our 
future relations to Cuba, when it is proposed to intervene for the 
purpose of expelling the government of Spain. And it Spain should 
be expelled by our aid, and, at the close ot the war, the island 
should remain, as probably would be the case, in our possession, 
20Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba,n Forum, XXI (May, 1896), 
pp. 286-287. 
it is doubtful whether the confidence of the world in the benevo-
lence of our motives would be strong enough to save us from the 
imputation of having committed a wiltu1 act of spo1iation.21 
Another Who felt that the majority ot the people were not capable ot 
se1t-government and who te1t also that it was not part ot our burden to 
extend our American institutions was James Bryce. In the December Forum 
he wrote: nOne sometimes hears it said that her mission is to spread 
democratic principles. Polynesians and Asiatics, Creole Spaniards and 
mulattoes are not tit to receive those princip1esw Neither are negroes 
tit, as the history of Haiti and of most of the South American so-called 
'republics' proves.,,22 
Altruism was again pointed out by Henri Rochefort, editor of 
L' Intrapsigeant, when he wrote in FOM ot the sympathy of the French 
people for the Cubans and then concluded: 
How much more actively ought these sympathies to manitest themselves 
in the great American republic, which, but its proximity, as well as 
by economic interests, is bound to Cuba, and which certainly has not 
forgotten in a century the history of its struggles for its own in-
dependence • • • Who is the adversary? • • • It is the power, at 
once imbecUe and tyrannous, that disseminates everywhere anger and 
revolt - - in the Philippine Islands as well as in Cuba - - after 
having caused the whole ot Latin America to rise up against it. 
Between republican Cuba and monarchical Spain can t!'!ose hesitate to 
believe in the meaning of the words "progress," "liberty," and 
"humanity?lt23 
21John Bassett Moore, "The ,<uestion of Cuban Belligerency," Forum, 
XXI (May, 1896), pp. 298-299. 
22at. Hon. James Bryce, "The Policy ot Annexation tor America," Forum, 
XXIV (December, 1897), p. 394. 
23Henri Rochefort, "The United States and Cuba," Forum, XXIII 
(April, 1897), pp. 156-157. 
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And later in the same article, he even more pointedly stated the 
meaning of the "white man t 15 burden." He wrote: "The great American republic 
holds in its hands the destiny of an oppressed people, whose heroism and 
patriotic sacrifices have rendered it a hundred times worthy of liberty. 
Will the United States decline to speed the hour of justice? The cause 
of the Cuban insurgents is that of Humanity. ,,24 
In reaction ag~inst the imperialist idea of the great civilizing and 
protecting mission ot the United States, Nation r~ferred to those people 
who talk about not shrinking selfishly and timidly within the narrow bonds 
of the United States, but feel that the countr,y should go forth and redress 
the wrongs of other countries and rescue the oppressed. But Nation felt 
that the mission was, as it stated: 
• • • a grandiose conception, but there is nothing grandiose about 
the missionaries who are to execute it. What they have in their 
minds is a remorseless trampling upon native rights, opportunities tor 
personal enrichment, readiness to pick a quarrel with ever,y nation 
that gets in their way, and an era of general national extravagance 
and waste and oppressive taxation. That... is what the benevolent 
mission ot the United States will come to a.n execution - - its 
tender mercies proving cruel - - and that is the end to which the 
Hawaiian beginning will surely conduct us.25 
Furthermore, in the talk again of Hawaiian annexat:ion, Na.tion did not 
feel that the economic interest for the Islands should enter, but that 
only a high moral plane should be the basis in discussing annexation. Then 
with a "t.ongue in the cheek" remark, it stated: "It is \'llell if all this 
24 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
25Nation, LXIV (June 17, 1897), p. 448. 
is now removed from the debate and if it can aga.in dwell upon the lofty 
morality of 3,000 aliens giving away the territory and sovereignty of 
97,000 natives and residents. n26 
Again, just as earlier, Nation felt that it was a misunderstood 
"white man's burden" that would force institutions and governments on a 
people, not allowing them the freedom of choice by voting. As it said 
in an editorial: 
••• many well-meaning people have been deceived with the idea that 
we are delivd~ing a people from monarchical tyranny and substituting 
republican government instead, thereof, whereas we are doing the very 
opposite thing, if the first words of our Declaration of Independence 
are a true definition of republican institutions ••• It we were 
disposed to do equal and exact justice, we should allow the 
Hawaiians to vote on the question of having a Queen, if they want one, 
but that, we acknowledge, is now impracticable. It is not 
impracticable to allow them to vote on the question of annexation. 27 
Murat Halstead appealed to the altruistic feeling in the September 
Forum, in writing about American annexation and armament, when he wrote: 
"We have assumed a protectorate ot Hawaii, and for the second time, urge 
a treaty ot anner..ation ot those islands. We have cb.imed rights as a 
humane Power, with faith in self-government, and a consciousness of the 
manifest destiny, to do the things counting tor freedom and peace and the 
extension ot our just infiu.ence in Cuba. ,,28 
In two issues in Karch, Nation criticized the enlightened seU-interest 
26Ibid., LXV (October 7, 1897), pp. 270-271. 
27Ibid., (November 25, 1897), p. 410. 
2~urat Halstead, "American Annexation and Armament, It Forum, XXIV 
(September, 1897), p. 65. 
of the imperialists and appealed to the moral point of view. In its 
editorial, Nation asked: "Are we morally ready for war with Spain? Have 
we a cause of war so clear, so loftily imperative that all the hideousness 
of camage and the fearful blow to civic progress must be hazarded in order 
to vindicate humanity and righteousness.,,29 
And in the next issue, NatioQ sadly admitted: "In fact, these open 
avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy property for purposes of 
private gain were probably the most grotesque outcome of Christianity and 
civilization that the Westem world has ever had, and it has had many. "30 
Later in the same article, Nation admitted and acknowledged the 
necessity of war under certain circumstances, "if there is no other reason, 
in order that the higher civilization, which in our day is apt to find its 
expression in superior strength, shall have its due influence in the order-
ing of human affairs.")! 
But Forum again took a different position. In the March issue, 
Senator Money regretted that two administrations had given but slight 
recognition to the public sentiment of the people to come to the succor 
of the Cubans. He explained that thirteen consuls of the United States in 
Cuba had truthfully portrayed the dreadful conditions of the island; yet 
the official representations had not affected the policy of the Presidents 
29Natlon, LXVI (March 24, 1898), p. 218. 
3OIb1d., (March 31, 18<)8), p. 238. 
31Ibid. 
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and Cabinets. He appealed to the responsibility of Americans to humanity 
when he concluded: "The truth is, that the bond and stock market is today 
the most potent factor in the government of nations; and the men who compose 
it care but little for the general business ot the mass of the people, for 
liberty, tor religion, or for humanity. "32 
This spirit of the heavily emotional "White man's burden" was used by 
imperialists and anti ... imperialists alike. It was used for Hawaii, Samoa, 
Cuba, and the Philippines. It was used up to the very climax itse1t, when 
McKinley found his answer - that "there was nothing left for us to do but 
to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and 
Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as 
our fellow-men tor whom Christ also died. ,,33 It was used thus as a motive 
or pattern forming the basis for this new imperialism ot 1898 - this 
motive or pattern of the "white man's burden. II 
32Senator H. D. Money, 'tOur Duty to Cuba," Forum, xx.v (March, 1898) 
p. 24. 
33C. S. Olcott, ~ MJ:t 2!. William McKinley, Vol. II (Boston and 
New York, 1916), p. 111. 
CHAPTER V 
PORTRAYAL OF "SELF-DEFENSE" IDEA 
IN LITERARY MAGAZINES 
There can be little doubt, in light ot the analysis thus tar presented, 
that ideological and religious considerations stand in the tront rank among 
those factors that composed the pattern of American expansionism during the 
years 1893-1898. However, these considerations present a pattern that is 
by no means complete; hardly less dignificant is the large body of 
expansionist sentiment which centered around the revival of interest in the 
United States Navy, in self-defense and 8ecurity. The new imperialists ot 
1898 used the principle of national defense as an important motive in their 
expan8ionist undertakings. 
The naval revival of the eighties and nineties did not result entirely 
from economic and political considerations, nor from the influence of a few 
individuals. Important also were the psychological element8 underlying 
these other factors. The expansion of the navy resulted partly from a 
growing national consciousness and national pride, from natural combative-
ness, assertiveness, and greed, from a feeling of interiority made acute by 
the wide gap ~ich separated American naval progress from that of the great 
world powers. 
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It is also likely that a teeling of tear dictated an expansion of the 
navy during these years. Naval expansion was to a large degree based upon 
strategic considerations, upon a desire to strengthen the nation's detenses. 
This emphasis upon detense stemmed to some extent trom a feeling of insecurity, 
anxiety, and fear. This emotion was part17 natural and sincere, arising 
out of the realities of this country's naval weakness, and partly sympathetic, 
resulting from the propaganda ot the expansionists, who, if they did not 
create this teeling, certainly fostered it and played upon it tor their own 
purposes. Whatever the explanation, this emotion was a basic part of the 
psychological background of naval expansion. 
The United States needed Hawaii, according to the imperialists, either 
as annexed territory or a protectorate, .and ot the two, annexation was 
much to be fr,:;ferred. The American press urged the self-defense argument 
because of alleged or real British intrigue in Honolulu. 
Selt-deiense or national security gained great support through Alfred 
Mahan. He iJJDediately manifested concern over Hawaii and our sea power in 
the March issue ot Forum. He spoke of the value ot any naval position, and 
then reterred all this to the Hawaiian group. He concluded: 
From the foregoing considerations may be interred the importance 
of the Hawaiian Islands as a position powerfully influencing the 
commercial and military control of the Pacific, and especially of 
the northern Pacific, in which the United States, geographically, 
has the strongest right to assert hersell. These are the main 
aci:ra.ntage s, which can be termed posi ti Ve : those, namelr' which 
directly advance commercial security and naval control. 
1 Alfred T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, XV 
(March, 1893), p. 7. 
In addition, Mahan discussed acquisition by a foreign power: 
To the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions, 
which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would 
constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be 
made. The serious menace to our Pacific coast and our Pacific trade, 
if so important a position were held by a possible ene~, has been 
frequently mentioned in the press and dwelt upon in the diplomatic 
papers which are from time to time given to the public. Upon one 
particular, too much stress cannot be laid • • • the immense disad-
vantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well 
within twenty-five miles.2 
Mahan's views were debated by the Nation. It refused to accept 
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Mahan' s reasoning and used counter-arguments rejecting his premises. Nation 
felt that Mahan wrote almost purely as a naval tactician and that he made 
out the Hawaiian Islands to be of great strategic importance, if a naval 
war of tremendous proportions were to break out. But, Nation insisted: 
"All this may be freely admitted without allowing it to be a reason of any 
force whatever in favor of annexation." It went on to argue that in the 
first place, it would be a departure from all that is traditional and all 
that is best or necessary in the policy of this country, to make any plans 
whatever for such a contingency as Captain Mahan contemplated. The 
editorial maintained that the people of the United States would reject this 
idea that one's country must embark upon these warlike adventures in order 
to become a naval Power of the first rank. So, Nation felt, any privileges 
in the way of a coaling station or naval stores, the United States either 
had at their disposal or could be had for the asking.3 No change is 
necessary for self-defense or in the name of "vital interest," according to 
Nation's conclusions. 
In another editorial, Nation similarly rejected any change being 
necessary in the management of the islands. To Nation, there was no 
question of self-defense or of vital interest as seen by the imperialists. 
Americans had governed the islands during most of the time since they had 
possessions on the Pacific Coast. And, as Nation stated: "We have been 
spared the trouble of fortifying them and keeping a large naval force in 
those waters and settling their private quarrels • • • As other nations 
have respected our wishes in the matter in the past, they would respect 
them in the future all the more as our powr to command respect increases 
with revolving years. ,.4 
Nation repeated this argument and plea for status S22 further in the 
February 16th issue. In it, Nation, like Forum, linked foreign imperialism 
or intrusion with the islands. It explained that the treaty of 1875, and 
extended in 1887, gave the United States "everything we want - free trade 
with the islands, a coaling station, and complete protection against every 
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description of foreign intrusion • • • Th~re is therefore, not the slightest 
occasion for any kind of precipitate action. lt5 There would seem to be no 
real basis then for the self-defense idea, according to Nation, at this time. 
3 
. Nation, LVI (March 2, 1893), p. 154. 
4Ibld. (February 2, 1893), p. 75. 
5Ibiq• (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174. 
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Mahan's contention that a large navy was necessary for the growth of 
the United States was again questioned by several editorials and a~~icles 
in Nation. In the March 9th editorial, Nation was aware of the truth of 
Mahan's thought as presented in the Harch Forum -- that Hawaii had value 
as a coaling station, in case the United States were at war with another 
great naval Power in the Pacific Ocean. It also realized the difficulty 
which possession of it would be to a rival or ene~. But -- it pointed 
out, that Mahan's whole argument was based on the assumption that the United 
States was to have a navy as large and as powerful as the navies of France 
and England put together. As Nation said: 
• • • to make Hawaii of use to us as a coaling station in a war with 
Great Britain ••• we must have a navy large enough not only to 
protect our coasting trade and our cities on the Atlantic and the 
Pacific from the assaults of British cruisers, bgt to make British 
cruisers afraid to go near the Sandwich ISlands. 
This was Naval politics that Natiol1 viewed warily. Again, in the 
March 16th issue, in an item called "Armed Evangelists," Nation spoke out 
against the need of a navy. It again conceded that it would be well to 
have a respectable navy for the defense of the coasts and the patrol of the 
seas, and the protection of United States ci-tizens in "semi-civilized 
countries," but it would not be well to h~ve such a navy made the nucleus 
of an enormous sea force, to be "played for all its worth" at every 
Presidential election.7 
6Ibid., (February 16, 1893), p. 115. 
7Ibid., (March 16, 1893), p. 191. 
Forum, in June, 1893, presented the views of Thomas Cooley, President 
of the American Bar Association, against Hawaiian annexation. Cooley 
rejected not only the self-defense argument, but also the foreign imperialism 
-- the fear that if we did not take them Great Britain would.8 Nation 
pointed out the false impression given or spread by the imperialists that 
England wanted the islands, the "FUiglish scare" that the United States had 
to prevent foreign imperialism with concern for her own security and vital 
interest.9 James Schouler, lawyer and historian, in Forum, also brushed 
aside the fear of British or other foreign interference to seize the islands 
if the United States did not.10 
The security and vital interest theme were again criticized by Nation 
in 1894. In the first section of one of its articles, Nation struck out 
againat the "well-known Jingoism" of Chairman Morgan of the Senate Committee, 
reporting in relation to the Hawaiian Islands. Nation irritably stated: 
Incidentally he [Senator Morgan] tried to please everybody concerned 
in the Hawaiian affair, with the natural result of pleasing nobody; 
but his main intent was to make hia report a powerful argument for 
a big navy, and the Nicaragua Canal, and coaling stations thick aa 
blackberries, and general bumptiousness and insolence in foreign 
affairs.ll 
8 Thomas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, If Forum, 
XV (June, 1893), p. 392. 
9Nation, LVII (November 16, 1893), p. 362 and (November 23, 1893), p. 384. 
10James Schouler, "A Review of the Hawaiian Controversy," Forum, XVI 
(February, 1894), pp. 670-675. 
llNation, LVIII (April 19, 1894), p. 284. 
Nearly all of the officers who were examined by Senator Morgan agreed with 
that terror of the world's navies, that the United States cannot be too 
quick about preparing for a naval war in the Pacific and forti~ng Pearl 
Harbor, as the true way of bringing to naught the craft and power on an 
enemy's ships - "say British ships," as the Alabama Senator innocently 
remarked, and Nation ridiculed.12 
But later in the same article, Nation referred to the most "luminous 
and cogent" views of Commander Houston, who held that: 
• • • in time of war and without a navy equal or nearly equal to 
that of the greatest naval power, the possession of the Hawaiian 
Islands would be a source of weakness rather than strength • • • 
We should ultimately have to let them go ••• after having wasted 
a lot of money.1J 
As to the likelihood that the United States would authorize the creation 
of a great naval force, Houston thought that a calm inquiry as to the 
attitude of Congress and the country on that question would show the thing 
to be 80 improbable that one need seek no further tor reasons for not 
acquiring the islands. Nation approved of his rejection ot the naval 
theme. 
Nation respected Captain Mahan as an authority, but it rejected his 
constant demand for naval power. It criticized Mahan who had evaluated 
the naval programme of Earl Spencer ot England. Nation commented on this: 
l2Ib1d., p. 285. 
IJIbid., p. 286. 
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• • • he did say that a strong naval force was important, more now 
than ever, for Britain • • • because of her foreign possessions. 
Then this author Mahan comments how it may be good for national 
pride, but it is also very inconvenient and that many Englishmen 
would not enter into the "British EmpireM as a programme now today. 
• • • Nevertheless, it our naval officers had their way, Capt. 
Mahan included, they would load us with similar responsibilities, 
in the shape of outlying dependencies, posts, garrisons, and 
coaling stations, without a particle of the excuse which England 
had for her expans10n.14 
Later, Nation again alluded to Captain Mahan and stated: "In short, 
the new school of naval experts, with their great learning and scientific 
attainments, tends distinctly to throw an unreal glamour about war, and to 
make it little else than a beautiful demonstration of mathematical theses 
or problema in mechanica or ballistics." In proof, it concluded: "It 
anyone is yet in doubt about the way the growth of the navy itself has 
fostered a warlike spirit among us, and made it seem a light thing to go 
to war, he need only look at the effect of the new navy on the last two 
secretaries of the deparbaent. n15 Nation cited Secretary Tracy and 
Secretary Herbert as being phMged persons, thinking only of war and 
deatruction.16 Security and vital interest were excuses in this constant 
naval power theme, all rejected by Nation. 
Nation was by no means convinced of the danger of foreign imperialism 
either. It criticized those agencies and individuals who were twisting 
14Nation, LVIII (May 17, 1894), p. 357. 
l5Ibid., LIX (November 8, 1894), p. 337. 
l6Ibid., LX (April 18, 18<)5), p. 292. 
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the truth. It spoke of the latest news in this regard, that "if Great 
Britain neglected her opportunity to grasp the islands, the danger of 
Japan's seizing them increases," Jingoism, it seemed, had taken possession 
of certain Japanese politicians, hence Nation concluded that they had 
their Morgans and Lodges and Fr,yes, a stern rebuke to the supporters of 
the "security and vital interest tl theme of the expansionists.17 
Lodge proved his support of this theme by his article in the March 
Forum. He very strongly insisted: 
With England reaching out for every island in the Pacific, and with 
British sympathy strongly manifested for the royalist government, 
this administration hae done everything in its power to breRk 
down our well-settled policy in regard to theBe islands, which 
are so essential to us, both cODlllercia1ly and from a military 
point of view. 18 
The danger of foreign imperialism was a basis for expansionism declared 
necessary by Lodge. 
Nation again in 1896, in its editorial, questioned the need for a 
large navy. A.s it insisted: "The navies of the great naval Powers are 
meant to carry on wars with each other, which their past history and 
experience lead them to exist." But Nation maintained, there did not 
exist in the case of the United States a single one of the reasons which 
excused the large navies in Europe. As it proved: "We have no foreign 
possessions. We have no interest in European quarrels.,,19 And in the 
l7Ibid., LX (April 18, 1895), p. 292. 
18 Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, XIX 
(March, 1895), p. 8. 
19Nation, LX (February 13, 1896), p. 138. 
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following editorial, it re-iterated this lack of the danger of foreign 
imperialism and this lack of a need .for a great navy, when it stated: 
The stories and news agencies invent every now and then of a 
determination ot Great Britain to assume a bellicose attitude toward 
us, by purchasing Cuba from Spain, or seizing Hawaii from the 
missionaries, are childishly silly. There is nothing which practical 
men in Europe view with more wonderment than our naval preparations 
and our apparent desire to fight somebody.20 
The Commander of the first Naval Battalion, J. W. Miller wrote an 
article tor Forum. He stated his case tor preparing for the security and 
vital interest ot the United States when he said that the only necessar,y 
thing was to tace the fact that the country was earnestly convinced ot 
the vital importance ot a policy, called "Monroe It or It jingo, II it did not 
matter -- the policy that no European power shall enlarge its territory 
on the continent without the consent of the United States.21 Commander 
Miller then went on to suggest that Congress begin a system ot coast 
defenses and the construction of more battleships, the tormation ot a 
General Staff, more ships and troops -- in other words, anything necessary 
for the selt-detense and security of the United States.22 
Henry Cabot Lodge once more made his views known in Forum, this time 
on the duty ot the United States to Cuba. He appealed to the motive ot 
vital interest specifically, and he upbraided the present administration 
20 l!2i5!., (February 20, 1896), p. 152. 
2lJ • W. Miller, "Rumors ot War and Resultant Duties," Forum, XXI 
(April, 1896), pp. 238-239. 
22Ibid., p. 240. 
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when he wrote: "Evllry Administration, until we reach the one now in 
power, has declared in the plainest terms to the government of Spain and 
to the -world that the condition of Cuba was a matter in which tho United 
States had a vital interest. ,,23 Then appealing to the danger of foreign 
imperialism he continued: "Every reasonable man who gives any thought 
to this subject will admit that the fate of Cuba is of great importance to 
the United States; that under no circumstances should we permit Spain to 
transfer the island to any other European power." 
"Vital interest" was again appealed to in Forum by Senator Cullom. 
He pointedly stated: "If ever it happens that the era of oppresoion and 
bloodshed shall cease in Cuba, and that the United States shall possess 
that rich gem of the West Indies • • • it will be because we are bound 
to protect the interests of the United States by Ocean and Gulf wherever 
those interests develop themselves.,,24 
Nation was again attacking the foreign imperialism scare in December, 
1896. It commented on the fact that Ex-Secretary Foster was back from 
Hawaii with his arguments again, and that he had one conclusive argument 
in reserve: "If the islands are not annexed by the United States they 
will be by some other of the great Powers." But Nation tried to assure 
itself, "this appoal to self interest is not clear, was so overworked four 
23z.octge, "Our Duty to Cuba, It Forum, XXI (May, 1896), pp. 279-280. 
24Senator S. M. Cullom, "Blunders of a Democratic Administration," 
Forum, XXI (August, 1896), p. 719. 
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years a~, and has become so ludicrous by lapse of t.ime, that we do not 
look to see it have much effect on a country and a Congress that show 
signs of being decidedly weary of Hawaii. u25 
The islands were seen by various newspapers and periodicals, such as 
Washington ~, San Francisco Evening Bulletin, and Review 2! Reviews,26 
as a "key to the Pacific" in this theme of self-defense and vital interest. 
But this enthusiasm was, however, not unanimous. Some papers and periodi. 
cals as~ed a cautious or hostile attitUde from the beginning. 
Nation, a.s was seen, was one of these periodicals. By May, 1897, it 
was writing sha.rply and pointedly against this argument of "key to the 
Pacific," of vital interest and defense. Commenting on a lecture for 
Hawaiian annexation by Mr. John Foster it upbraided Mr. Foster 
••• who pins his faith mainly to the theory which has such a 
peculiar fascination for cert.ain minde, that the islands constitute 
the "key to the Pacific, If and therefore If!. lI:l.I:k .b!!!! .tJl!.m arrmow. 
As he tells us himself, that they stand at the center of an other-
wiae unoccupied circle of water having a radius ot about two thou-
sand miles, one may be pardoned tor suggesting that the key does 
not seem to fit the hole, and that after going to the trouble ot 
securing it we might tind it incapable of turning the lock. 
It then went on to criticize the key idea as a palpable absurdity, insulting 
to the intelligence of the people of the United States, pointing out that 
'tif the island stood in the middle of a passageway of only moderate width 
eo that their occupation could be made effective for the purpoee of block-
iug the way against the vessels of othar nations, then they might be called 
25Nation, LXIII (December 3, 1896), p. 1~3. 
26San Francisco Evening Bulletin, (January, 1893), Washington Post, 
(January 30, 1893), Review 91. Reviews, VII (March, 1893), pp. 13l-l~ 
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the IIkey to the Pacific. II But. it reasoned, even in tha.t case the duty 
of the United 0tatos to acquire them would have been far from clear because 
an international guarantee of the freedom of such a passage would have 
been of greater value than the exclusive ownership, with the ensuing 
necessity of expensive fortifications and the increased danger of bloody 
complications with other Powe~a.27 
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Passing on from the key idea, Nation brought in the foreign imperialism 
and self-defense theme again in 1897. and accused Foster of waIlting the 
islands for the purpose of securing this outpost of the Pacific frontier, 
and thus protecting the future mighty commerce and rapidly growing 
interests on that coast from the encroachments of the great Powers striving 
for ascendancy in that quarter of the globe. Again Nation rejected this 
logic when it argued: 
~ben one remembers that it takes a fast steamer about five days 
to reach any point of our coast from Honolulu, the idea of the 
islands as a defense is on a par in absurdity with the key idea. 
• • • As a matter of course a little group of islands, incapable of 
supporting from its own resources a. population large enough to 
furnish more than a mere handful of fighting men, could never 
add anything to the defensive strength ot the nation owning it. 
unless its position commanded some necessary avenue of approach. 28 
And, Nation concluded, in the present case the United States would be merely 
adding another point to be defended, and very difficult of deftlnse at that. 
if the Unit~d States ever engaged in a war in the Pacific. 
27Nation, LXIV (May 6, 1897), p. 332. 
28Ibid., p. 333. 
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The myth of foreign imperialism was again the focal point of Nation's 
remarks, when it very sarcastically stated some arguments in favor of 
annexation. As it said: "It the United States does not 'grab' the islands, 
the Japanese will. They already outnumber the Americans greatly, they are 
increasing rapidly, they are titted tor the climate and tor its industries, 
and their destiny is so much more manitest than ours that it will prevail 
it we delay any longer. The presentation ot these reasons should appeal 
torcibly to the sense of justice which distinguishes the American people.,,29 
One ot Forum's writers agreed with the views of Nation. Senator 
\Vhite used some ot the arume arguments that Nation had used in its ~~y 6th 
editorial. He tirst denied the contention that the United States had to 
have ,the islands tor purposes ot protection or selt-defense. He telt that 
the United States could make a better contest without than with Hawaii. 
It the United States accomplished annexation for detensive purposes it 
would have to fortity the new domain and build a navy capable ot sustaining 
it. Senator White, pointed out that the naval strength of the United 
States was increasing very slowly, while leading EuropM.n competitors were 
acting with more alacrity. 
Senator ~'Jhite also reviewed the desire ot other countries to acquire 
Hawaii and in this he stated: 
29Ibid., LXV (July 15, 1897), p.,,' 39. 
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But it is urged that England, in case of trouble, may seize Honolulu, 
and that the ~apanese may do so. England clearly will not operate 
against us from Honolulu. She has a veritable Gibraltar at Esquimault 
on the Washington boundary. Why should she divert and divide her 
strength by permitting her guns to rust two thousand miles from her 
enemey, especially when she is splendidly equipped at a point within 
sight of the smoke of our civilization? For more than forty years 
England has denied any hostility to Hawaii.30 
Senator h~ite continued point by point to reject all the demands and reason-
ings of the annexationist8. He insisted that we did not need the Islands 
to defend the Nicaraguan Canal, as the western terminus would not have been 
better protected by guns mounted at Hawaii than by those which guard the 
Golden Gate. Also, the battleships of the United States could be dispatched 
from California to Nicaragua more speedily than from Honolulu. So, to 
annex the Hawaiian Islands, Senator White maintained would weaken, not 
strengthen our military position or self-defense. 
Nation was happy to cite the President of the Hawaiian Republic, 
Mr. Dole, on the theme of foreign imperialism. Mr. Dole hac denied the 
Bureau's idea that if the United States refused to annex the islands, 
then the Republic would offer itself to any of the Powers which stood 
waiting to see what the United States did about the matter. Mr. Dole 
contended that the Republic would simply go on as before. And Nation 
willingly added: "This admission was hard for Hatch, the Hawaiian Minister 
in vlashington to bear. 1t3l 
Annexationists brought forward the testimony of military and naval 
30 Senator Stephen M. ~ihite, "The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii," 
Forum, XXIII (August, lSCn), pp. 724-726. 
31 Nation, LXVI (January 27, 1898), p. 52. 
experts. In his plea for Hawaii as a coaling station and port, Hon. John 
Proctor referred to Mahan who had likened a modern warship without coal 
"to a wingless bird." Proctor then went on to sa,.: 
In the possession of a hostile power, Hawaii would give an additional 
base for coaling and repair trom which to attack our extended coast-
line. With Hawaii in our possession, and Pearl Harbor fortified 
and stored with coal -- furnishing a safe harbor tor our merchant-
men -- we need fear no attack from a cross the Pacific. We should 
require fewer war ships in the Pacific, and fewer fortifications on 
our Western and Alaskan coasts, than would be required if Hawaii 
should remain in its present condition or pass to the possession 
ot a foreign Power. 32 
In competition with this ambitious program of aggressive foreign 
policy and territorial expansion, was James Bryce's article in the December 
issue of the Forum. He wrote, he stated, from an American point of view, 
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and maintained very strongly that Great Britain had no direct interest in 
the fortunes of either Cuba or Hawaii. Going on to the argument most 
frequently used in the United States for the annexation of Cuba and Hawaii, 
that insisting on the strategic strength gained to American by their annexa-
tion, Bryce immediately brushed it aside. It had been said that the Island 
would give the United States two points of naval vantage - one commanding 
the Caribbean Sea and the other the Eastern Pacific, thus protecting her 
southern and western coasts. Bryce argued that the United States was 
exceptionally strong in this position already. He then questioned it it 
would be worth while for the United States to build and maintain a navy that 
would be necessary if the United States wanted to defend the islands. He 
3~on. John R. Proctor t "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 386-388. 
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admitted disagreement with the views of Captain Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt 
in their plea tor a strong navy. He concluded by observation that.it there 
were any torce in these considerations, it followed that the annexation of 
either Cuba or Hawaii would be a source not of strength but ot weakness. 
America did not want to see either island fall into the hands of any 
possible naval ene~, but, Br,yce concluded, neither is threatened with any 
such danger, and the expression ot the feelings of the United States would 
be sufficient at any time to avert it.33 
Senator Morgan, in the March issue of the Forum, answered Mr. Bryce's 
questioning attitude on the wisdom of the United States in desiring to 
annex the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Morgan proved its wisdom especially in 
pointed out the necessity of the Islands as held by the opinions and 
reports ot sldlled and experienced officers of the Army and Navy "who 
declare that Hawaii is indispensable to the protection of our western coast." 
He held that self-defense was a basis for the annexation of the islands.34 
Daniel Agnew, ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Penns,ylvanla, 
in Forum, gave a lesalist's view against an aggressive foreign policy and 
territorial expansion. He disregarded the argument that precedents were 
cited to justify annexation, and concluded that precedents did not amend 
the Constitution. His advice was: "If we fea.r foreign nations, arm our 
coasts and defend our ports! If we need a harbor or coaling station, 
33Rt. Hon. James .Bryce f "The Pollcy of Annexation for America, If Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 386-388. 
34Senator John T. Morgan, "The Duty of Annexing Hawaii," Forum, XXV 
(March, 1898), pp. 14-15. 
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secure it by treatyl If these be assailed, defend them by force of arms, 
as we do other rights! ,,35 tJeither security nor vital interest then required 
this policy of imperialism, according to Mr. Agnew. 
Nation made its final efforts to undo all of the arguments of the 
imperialists in regard to security, vital interest, and foreign imperialism. 
It accused Senator Frye of "suppressing the fa.ct that we have a perpetual 
right to the use of Pearl Harbor as a coaling station," when he asked where 
the United States would get its c08l. 36 It argued that "without Hawaii, 
all our naval force in the Pacific may be employed in attacks upon the 
enemy or in defending our own coast. With it, we must expend some part, 
and probably a large part, in defending the islands. ,,37 
Nation viewed the security and vital interest of the United States, 
the defense of its shores, and its freedom from foreign imperialism, all 
part of the future of the United States, without this imperialist or 
expansionist policy. At the same time, expan8ionists relied on the self-
ciefense and vital interest pattern of thought, the fea.r of foreign 
imperialism theme, as part of their ideology in support of the "new 
imperialism" of 1898. 
35Daniel Agnew, "Unconstitutionality of the Hawaiian Treaty," Forum, 
XXIV (December, 1897), p. 469. 
J6Nation, LXVI (February 3, 1898), p. SO. 
37Ibid., (February 10, 1898), p. 99. 
CHAPTER VI 
LITERARY MAGAZINES REFLECTION OF 
"PARAMOUNT INTEREST" 
The thesis that islands and new lands were essential to the defense 
of the coasts of the United States appears to have derived its appeal at 
least partly from the notion of their necessity to the defense of an interest 
of quite a different character. This paramount interest was for the "national 
honor" ot the United States and, implied in this, tor commercial expansion 
or economic necessity. Thus Pacific islands were desired for their provision 
of markets and raw materials. In other words, the islands were the out-
posts not only of coastal defense, but also of the protection of a new 
paramount interest, overseas commerce, contributing to the greater national 
honor of the United States. 
It was not really until the Hawaiian issue of 1893 that expansion ot 
commerce began to seem an imperative reason for expansion of territory. 
Thus the national honor of the country and economic necessity became a 
paramount interest. 
Captain Alfred Mahan himself was an influential monitor in his 
article of 1893 on the bearing of the annexation of Hawaii upon the 
"commercial and military control of the Pacitic. fI As he stated: These 
are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely, 
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which directly advance commercial security and naval control. 01 
It was suggested at the very beginning ot the controversy that the 
revolution and the movement tor annexation were simply outgrowths ot a 
conspiracy ot the sugar interests to get the bounty ot two cents a pound 
paid to domestic sugar growers. Nation called attention to the contract 
between the Hawaiian planters and the Western Sugar Retining Company --
the Spreokels concern in San Francisco, a branch ot the Sugar Trust --
whereby the corporation would receive one-halt ot any bounty that might 
be paid to the planters. "Even it Congress should retain the bounty on 
domestic sugar, and ehould annex the islands, it was realized that the 
islands might be denied enjoyment ot the bounty in whole or in part." Thus 
was expressed the opinion that the revolution was "ot sugar, by sugar, 
and tor sugar.,,2 
When the "snap" annexation ot the islands and the assured tailure 
ot the precipitate treaty appeared certain, Nation rejoiced and again 
criticized Senator Morgan's view that the annexation "would have helped 
our trade. 1t3 
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Rejecting the paramount interest in the Islands as contributing to our 
national honor, Nation likewise rejected Mahan's entreaty to tollow England's 
p. 7. 
1 A. T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, IV (March, 1893), 
~t1o,p., LVI (March 2, 1893), p. 151. 
3 Ibid., p. 154. 
example by such annexation of foreign territory and foreign population as 
it said simply "to promote certain undefined things which he calls national 
'influence' and national greatness. 1I4 
But John Proctor in the November issue ot Forum, was concerned with 
the national honor of the United States in regard to its battle for 
commercial supremacy. He wrote: 
We are fast building a Navy large enough to render all necessary 
protection to our merchants in foreign ports. Let us hope that the 
retorm in our Civil Service will be carried forward. • • and that 
all our consular representatives abroad shall be regarded as the 
business agents ot our people, and selected with regard to their 
business qualifications, and promoted for efficient service. When 
all these things have been done and the fetters of our restrictive 
laws removed, we shall enter the contest for industrial and commer-
cial supremacy with the conditions greatly in our tavor.; 
Nation too, commented on this type of commercial supremacy as BOught 
for by Captain Mahan, and linked it with the national honor theme, when 
it stated: "Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen in 1789 what 
the views ot a great many ot us as to the conditions o.r national greatness 
would be today, how sad it 'WOuld have made them. ,,6 And it laughed at 
Lodge's "Americanism," his trite appeal to national honor, in his analysis 
ot the foreign policy of the United States.7 
4Nation, LVI (March 9, 1898), p. 174. 
5 John R. Proctor, "America's Battle tor Commercial Supremacy, It Forum, 
XVI (November, 1893), p. 323. 
6Nation, LVIII (May 31, 1894), p. 401. 
7Ibid., (March 14, 1895), p. 191. 
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Lodge had criticized the blundering foreign policy of the United States, 
in not strengthening the national honor of the country. Lodge had re~ 
iterated Mahan's theme that "this Administration has done everything in its 
power to break down our well-settled policy in regard to t.hose islands 
Hawaiia which are so essential to us, both commercially and from a milita~J 
point of view." Lodge brought up the problem of economic necessity when he 
regretted the fact that it had become the fashion to neglect foreign 
relations of the United States and this unfortunate tendency had been greatly 
stimulated in recent years by the tariff reform or free trade agitation. 
He pointed to ideas borrowed fro. England, but he believed that the United 
States used them entirely different, in that England never allowed adherence 
to theory or foolish love of consistency to interfere with her interests. 
He insisted that the free trade ideas of the United States only harmed her, 
that the United States did not use them to get privileges in return. He 
concluded that these paramount interests should no longer be neglected.S 
To support Lodge' s view, Mahan, in writing on the navy as a career, 
pointed to the lack of concern of the people of the United States. Only 
toward foreign affairs, toward the national honor of the United States. 
Only those who either reside or have business interests in foreign lands 
where political conditions are unsettled, and justice at times hard to 
obtain show concern for national paramount interests.9 
S Henry Cabot Lodge "Our 31undering Foreign Policy," Forum, .uK 
(March, 1895), pp. 13-14. 
9Captain A. T. Mahan, "The Navy As a Career," Forum, XX (Nove~ber, 1895), 
p. 283. 
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But Nation criticized Mahan for his emphasis on constant development 
of the nation and of national sentiment, without consideration for any 
other thought or force.10 Nation considered national honor from a different 
viewpoint. In an editorial it struck out: "We need more men in public life, 
in the press, who seek national greatness in the sphere of mind and law, 
and resist the popular longing for more bloody corpses, desolated towne, 
and the general 'hell of death and destruction' called war. ull 
Nation again aired its views on this subject in a specific editorial 
entitled "National Honor." In questioning the appropriateness of a new 
and large navy it stated: 
• • • the reason which .a Jingo always falls back on, when hard 
pressed, for wishing to live in complete armor, is that somebody 
may assail our IIhonor" -- that is, say something offend ve, or 
refuse to submit to some demand of ours, or resent some of our 
language. It is impossible beforehand to describe or define 
injuries to honor, because honor is an impalpable thing. • • 
In short, when we get our navy and send it around the world in 
search of imputations on our honor, we shall have launched the 
United States on that old sea of sin and sorrow and ruffianisa 
on which mankind has tossed since the dawn of histor,r.12 
Reverting again to the economic necessity theme, Forum published 
two articles. The first was written by Edward Atkinson, author of !h! 
Collection 2! Revenue and !b!. Distribution g! Profits. In it, he spoke 
of trade, the purchasing power of countries, imports and exports, and 
then concluded: "It follows that the self-interest as well as the moral 
and political welfare of the people of the United States are bound up in 
l°Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234. 
llIbid., (October 31, 1895), pp. 304-305. 
12 Nation, LXII (January 16, 18<}6), p. 47. 
a close commercial union with the other English-speaking peoples." \-lith 
land, islands, etc. there must be union "for the protection ot commerce and 
for the assurance of peace and plenty wherever the dominion of the English 
speaking people and its influence extend. nl) 
In the second article, Henry Cabot Lodge referred to the duty of the 
United States in Cuba, in regard to her economic interests there. In 
speaking of the recurring revolutions and disorders in Cuba, he contended 
that "American property on the island is being destroyed and the commerce 
with Cuba is being ruined. It Later in the article, Lodge referred to 
Mr. Sumner's words that Cuba must be saved, and wrote: 
Mr. Sumner's words state the larger aspect of the question 
exactly as it is today. The danger to American property in Cuba, 
the ruin of American commerce, the immense field which would be 
opened to American enterprise, and the market which would be 
secured for American products by Cuban independence ••• are all 
weighty reasons for decisive action on our part.14 
Lodge here admitted that theee reasons were pecuniary, material, and 
interested, and though he also admitted to higher moral reasons, yet he 
deemed these others as important and necessary, for our national honor 
and for our economic necessity. 
In this same way Senator Frye found all of this a necessity and he 
would have been ready to seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the 
islands on the map, and would have reached out to take whatever was or 
l)Edward Atkinson, "The Cost of an Anglo-American War," Forum, XXI 
(March, 1896), p. 82. 
14Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba, II Forum, XXI (May, 1896), p. 283. 
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might be necessary to the future commercia.l supremacy of the United States 
and for these ideas Nation criticized him.1S 
Economic betterment for the United States was the result of Forum's 
article called "The Wanton Destruction of the American Property in Cuba." 
Yznoga was writing about the return of order and prosperity to Cuba as a 
result of its annexation by the United States, but feeling this impossible 
for the present, he argued that "could Cuba be purchased, the advantages of 
this country would be enormous. A vast field for American enterprise and 
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capital would be opened up •••• The cession of Cuba would also remove the 
large balance of trade against us. • • for it would open a market for at 
least a hundred millions of our products. n16 
On this same Cuban problem, Fidel Pierra, the Chairman of the Cuban 
Press Delegation, wrote in Forum: "But it from a politioal. point of view, 
it is to the interest of the United States that Spain should withdraw from 
Cuba, from an economic standpoint it is stUl more so." Pierra then 
referred to the fate of the Amerioan property under Spanish rule, the 
confiscation of whatever capital remained in Cuba, and the fact that 
commerce with the United States would fluctuate, and all of this pointed 
to his conclusion that the United States had to adopt a policy that would 
bring about the immediate withdrawal of Spain from Cuba.17 Economic 
necessity proved an important motive to the expansionists. 
l6Femando A. Yznoga, "The Wanton Destruction of the American Property 
in Cuba," Forum, XXII (January, 1897). p. 573. 
l7Fidel G. Pierra, "The Present and Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII 
(February, 1897), p. 670. 
The national honor motive was also again appealed to in reference to 
the Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Different views of "national honor lt 
were presented. As Coudert wrote in the March issue of Forum: 
Tradition had ordained that a national honor required to be lubri-
cated with blood in order to be kept in good working condition. • • • 
When a sufficient number of men had been slaughtered. and a proper 
number of towns had been burned and plundered, • • • Honor smiled 
once more with restored cheerfulness. • • • Honor, national honor. 
has been a priceless possession. but a very expensive one to keep. 
And later the author viewed honor as two great nations who were willing 
to abide by reason and to forego violence. As he said: 
• • • let us not be misled by high-sounding declamations about 
national honor. The only danger which our honor may run is in 
an exaggerated tendency to make readiness to strike, the test 
of its delicacy and the proof of its existence. • • • A Republic 
with a united nation of seventy millions behind it may stop to 
discuss without being taxed with timidity, and will not care if 
the effervescent mob that clamors for blood on all available 
occasions shall f~el outraged in its honor because of a generous 
forbearance to draw the nation's sword.1S 
So Coudert would imply, national honor should not be used as an excuse 
or motive by the aggressive imperialists. Theirs is a misunderstandir.g 
of the demands of the te~ Itnational honor." 
Business sentiment seemed still strongly antj.-war and Nation was 
quick to point out any new reaction. In April, 1897, it criticized the 
new appointment of a Jingo and annexationist as United States Minister 
to Hawaii, who might also try to rush the islands into the Union with the 
United States, but then Nation pointed to "new complications. • • • regard-
ing the sugar question, which involve the pending tariff bill, the 
18,. R. Coudert, "The Aon:lo-American Arbitration Treaty." Forum, XXIII 
(March, 1897), pp. 13, 22. 
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beet-sugar people in this country being now opposed to annexation as they 
are to reciprocity with Hawaii," and Nation concluded that these "new 
influences may thus enter into the decision of the problem now.,,19 
Economic concern by business may cause the imperialists to question their 
arguments on economic necessity, Nation hoped. 
The magazine again referred to Americ.an business interests in an 
editorial entitled "Fostering the Beet Sugar Industry." In its strike 
against the United States for its concern only for the "sixty millionaires" 
in Hawaii, who are Europeans and Americans and not for the 25,000 Japanese 
and others, Nation stated: 
Under the new taritf, it is computed that the duties on Hawaiian 
sugar, it it should be made to pay duties, would amount to from 
$8,000,000 to $12,000,000 a year. In other words, the present 
Administration with its eyes open or shut -- probably with them 
shut '... is binding the Government to pay bounties, amounting to 
at le4st 38,000,000 a year, upon Hawaiian sugar, to these sixty 
Hawaiian millionaires. Can the American sugar industry stand up 
against such tavoritism as that? Can the Secretary of Agriculture 
fight successfully for home-grown sugar against such odds as these?20 
The "jingo" in Congress or the press, was an object of intense dislike 
to the editors of business and financial journals, who sought to counter-
act his influence by anti-war editorials in their columns. Boards of 
trade and chambers of commerce added their pleas for the maintenance of 
peace to those ot the business newspapers and magazines. And Nation 
added its voice to both of these groups. On September 16, 1897, it 
hapoi1y reported that the annexationists in Hawaii were in a great deal 
19Nation, LXIV (April 29, 1897), p. 312. 
2ONation, LXV (August 5, 1897), p. 103. 
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of flutter over the arrival of the United States Senators and Representa-
ti ves who were to take a near view of their "republic for annexation only." 
It further reported that the "ungrateful natives" were preparillg tor the 
occasion a "monster petition, II to assert that their country was stolen 
tram them by a handful of rich and powerful whites, and that they did not 
want to be annexed. Nation conoluded: 
The worst of it is that most of the visiting statesmen are beet sugar 
men. Now a beet sugar American is almost certain to be pessimistic 
about the institutions ot cane-sugar Hawaii. He will take very high 
ground on liberty and constitutional guarantees and the right ot 
BUtfrage; and unless the Hawaiians are able to satisty him on all 
these points, he will never consent to let the beet sugar grown 
by tree men sutter competition trom the cane sugar ot men who are 
not enjoying selt-government. This is what makes the annexation-
ists so nervous. Jingoes they oan satisty, big-money men they can 
easily persuade that they are ripe tor annexation; but they tremble 
under inspection by statesmen thoroughly grounded in the doctrines 
of representative government and beet sugar.2l 
Becoming more desperate and determined to prove the talseness ot the 
"economic necessity" theme ot the imperialists, Nation invoked again the 
understanding of the people tor what was actually happening in regard to 
Hawaiian annexation. Advocates ot Hawaiian annexation had been relieved 
to hear that the Sugar Trust had withdrawn its opposition to the treaty. 
As it stated: "... somehow Spreckels has been • squared, • the island 
planters have been let into the 'deal,' and now all is clear sailing." And 
now, Nation cuttingly referred to the tact that the Senate could return to 
its high moral plane in discussing annexation. There had been tor a time, 
. Nation reported, a "mercenary tinge ll to the debate, which "must have 
2lIbid., (September 16, 1897), p. 2l5. 
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pained Senators" -- there was much talk of selfish opposition of beet-sugar 
growers and sugar refiners, and hints that there would be something sub-
stantial "in it" for certain \vestern Senators if they could beat the treaty. 
Now Nation stated: " ••• it could again dwell upon the lofty morality 
ot 3,000 aliens giving away the territory ot 97,000 natives and residents. ,,22 
And in its editorial in the same issue, Nation again linked this 
"economic necessity" with the unreasonable treatment of the Hawaiian people 
when it declared that less than 3,000 ot the "recent Anglo--Saxons" are 
pretending to have a right, and are brutally exercising it, to dispose ot 
the lives and fortunes ot 25,000 Japanese, 24,000 Chinese, 15,000 Portuguese, 
40,000 Hawaiians. And they are exercising it, Nation maintained, under the 
proud device, "Good :Ebsiness Chances Here. ,,23 
Then in March, 1898, Nation reterred very strongly tor the last time 
to the idea that the war with Spain had become simply a business enterprise. 
The sufterings ot the Cubans were wholly lost sight ot in the concem for 
economic necessity, the hope of making some money out ot a conflict in 
their behalt. Nation believed that when the present crisis arose, the 
business view of war was what was chieny present to the Jingo mind. Among 
the more rampant Jingoes, such as Senator Thurston ot Nebraska, this view 
seemed to prevail. Nation reported that Thurston, just the previoue week, 
said to the Senate that war with Spain would increase the business and the 
earnings ot every American railroad, it would increase the output of every 
22 ( llli., October 7, 1897), p. 271. 
23 ~., p. 272. 
American factory, it would stimulate every branch ot industry and every 
domestic commerce, it would greatly increase the demand tor American labor, 
and in the end every certificate that represented a share in ~nerican 
business enterprise would be 'WOrth more money than it was today. There 
seemed to be no "national honor" theme in thi3. According to Nation, it 
was the opposite, a reversal of "national honor." As it stated: 
In fact, these open avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy 
property for purposes of private gain were probably the most 
grotesque outcome of Christianity and civilization that the Western 
world has ever had. • • • The savage tights under the infiuence of 
inherited passions and devilish instincts and an animal view ot 
the ends ot life; but even he is not 80 degraded as to fight in 
order to make money in trade. 24 
fr'0rtU!! also included articles on the paramount interest ot "economic 
necessity theme." Senator White, though, referred to the argument that the 
commerce of the United States with Hawaii was 80 important that the United 
states could not aftord to risk outside interference. Senator White con-
ceded that the United States had valuable trade there, but felt that 
"common business sense dictates that a properly framed treaty. • • will 
bring all desirable Hawaiian commerce to the United States. The Hawaiian 
Islands will deal with us because their interests make such a course 
necessary. ,,25 
24Nation, LXVI (March 31, 1898), p. 238. 
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25Senator Stephen M. White, "The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii," Forum, 
XXIII (August, 1897), p. 728. 
But the Honorable John Proctor in Forum argued that our interests as 
well a8 our national honor demanded the annexation of the Hawaiian group. 
And our interests appeared to have been the large seaborne commerce on 
the Pacific that it would be necessary to protect.26 
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Daniel Agnew, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania wrote in Forum and maintained that according to the Constitution 
the United States could not annex Hawaii. He stated that there had always 
been a clear necessity for previous annexation, as LoUisiana, Florida, 
Alaska, and Texas, and he felt no paramount necessity or interest in the 
case of Hawaii. "Not a 8ingle benefit to be derived from its incorporation 
into the Union is an absolute or vital necessity. All its advantage8 are 
simply commercial, and they do not justify a power to purcha8e not found 
in the Con8titution."27 Hence the economic necessity of the imperialists 
did not satisfy the anti-imperialists. 
But in March, 1898, Senator Morgan in Forum, felt that commercial 
supremacy for the United State8 was Msicall)" important. He stated that 
the commercial rea80n8 for the annexation of Hawaii were not under-valued 
by any merchants, or marines, who have any acquaintance with the trade of 
the Pacific Ocean. And he concluded: "Annex Hawaii, and we will rapidly 
build up at Honolulu, in sight of Pearl Harbor, a commercial mart, like 
26 Proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," Forum, XXIV 
(September, 1897), p. 42. 
27Daniel Agnew, "Unconstitutionality of the Hawaiian Treaty," Forum, 
XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 465-466. 
Hong Kong, protected by a fortress, easy of construction, far stronger 
than Gibraltar that will stand sentinel over the surrounding ocean.for 
thousands of miles. ,,2$ 
All of this contributed in one way or another, either according to 
the views of the imperialists or the anti-imperialists, to the idea and 
the reality of the "national honor" of the United States, to her "economic 
security" and thus in the long-range plan, to her paramount interest. 
2$Senator John T. Morgan, "The Duty of Annexing Hawaii," Forum, YJ.V 
(March, 1898), pp. 15-16. 
CHAPTER VII 
"WORW LEADERSHIP" PAT'l'ERli OF THOUGHT 
In the year 1898, America was prepared to reach the height of her 
expansionist glory. Another motive or pattern of thought had arisen 
during the nineties to help lead her to this height. As Weinberg stated: 
"It was, in brief, the doctrine that imperialist expansion was a means to 
America t S assumption of a role of thorough-going collaboration in pursuing 
the interests and duties of world politics."l 
This doctrine was, of course, repudiated by the anti-expansionists, 
who constantly emphasized the fact that this idea conflicted sharply 
with the dominant American policy and attitude of the past, the principle 
of independent political action known as isolationism. 
Yet, throughout the course of the nineties, the restraining power of 
isolationism over American foreign policy visibly lost its strength. 
Having noted in 1890 the commercial and strategic needs which were enforcing 
upon this countrymen the beginning of an "outward view," Captain Mahan had 
written during the discussion of the Hawaiian issue in 1893, that "we 
also shall be entangled in the affairs of the great family of nations and 
shall have to accept the attendant burdens.,,2 
lweinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 453. 
2 Alfred Mahan, Interest of America !!l ~ Power, p. 104. 
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A foreshadowing of the transition to a larger political outlook also 
came in the Venezuelan issue of 1895. A spark of national pride led to 
the feeling that the United States was destined to affect the future of 
the world. And one realized that extent of this feeling when John R. 
Proctor stressed in his article in Forum, 1898, "that the retention of the 
Philippines was demanded by 'the interests of peace' -- that is, the 
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necessity of preventing a war of the powers to decide the proper depositor.y 
of this vhi te man' 8 burden. n3 
So America's conception of the territorial expansion essential to the 
international activities of a world power also had its foundation in the 
1890's, and Forum and Nation either supported this growing concept of world 
leadership as part of the "national prestige" and "political power" due 
to the new role of the United States, or reacted against it adversely as 
being contrary to any necessity for the well-being of the United States or 
of the world. 
Formerly, Hawaii's membership in America's economic system made it 
seem the one proper exception to the continental policy. In the expansion 
movement of 1893, Hawaii seemed to Mahan, in an article in Forum, only the 
first fruit of a policy entangling us in the commercial even if not the 
political rivalries of the outside world.4 
3John R. Proctor, nlsolation or Imperialism," Forum, XXVI (1898), p. 25. 
4A• T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, XV (March, 
1893), p. 9, 
Nation did not feel that the United States had to be entangled in 
such political and commercial rivalries as that, but, as it stated in an 
article on Hawaii: nAs other nations have respected our wishes in the 
mat ter in the past, they would respect them in the future all the more 
as our power to command respect increases with revolving years. 115 It 
further disagreed with Mahan's thesis to secure world leadership or more 
specifically national prestige and power by "following England t s example 
by such annexations of foreign territory and foreign populations as seem 
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likely to promote such undefined things which he calls national 'influence' 
and national greatness, by securing naval predominance on the Pacific, or 
'the control of the Pacific," as he calls it. n6 Nation followed this type 
of reasoning to its logical conclusion - that this type of "national 
prestige" 'WOuld require a. navy equal to the largest now existing, in order 
to secure and protect such outlying dependencies, and Nation did not vision 
this as worl~ leadership, but a "war of giants." 
In its review of Rev. Josiah Strongls book, The !!!l!~, Nation 
ridiculed his ideas that the civilization or all peoples is inversely as 
their isolation and that it is one e.f the signs of being on the verge of 
the millennium, or new era, that steam and electricity render isolation 
and therefore barbarism, impossible. So to save civilization, Strong would 
5Nation~ LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75. 
6 ~., (March 9, 1893), p. 174. 
imply, the United States must take its position as a world leader, but 
Nation disagreed with these generalizations.7 
In reviewing the foreign policy of the United States from 1893 to 
1895, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his article in Forum, regretted the Administra-
tion's policy of retreat and surrender. Lodge firmly believed that the 
United States must show its concern for national prestige and political 
power in a practical way, by its leadership in controlling Hawaii, Samoa, 
and Cuba. He believed that the United States had not become the leader 
of the world she should have become, because of the neglect of foreign 
relations. As he said: IIFor more than thirty years we have been so much 
absorbed with grave domestic questions that we have lost sight of these 
vast interests which are just outside our borders. They ought to be 
neglected no longer. n8 
~ation did not agree with Lodge or Mahan in their ideas of how the 
United States should acquire national prestige and political power. It 
regretfully commented: "Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen 
in 1789 what the views of a great many of us as to the conditions of 
national greatness would be today, how sad it would have made them. ,,9 
But Nation did agree with and applaud Mr. Gresham in his report on 
the Samoan matters to the President. Nation quoted Mr. Gresham's report: 
7Nation, LVII (July 20, 1893), p. 52. 
8 Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign policy, It Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 
pp. 15-17. 
9 ~Y.2!!I LVIII (May )1, 1894) I' p. 401. 
It is in our relations to Samoa that we have made the first 
departure from our traditional and well-established policy of 
avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relations 
remote from this hemisphere •••• Every nation, and especially 
every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse 
to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a 
highly imaginary way. To restrain the indulgence of such a 
propensity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to 
the world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the 
beneficence of popular government.lO 
Nation agreed with Mr. Gresham's conclusion that the experiences of the 
United States have shown it to be a wise policy to avoid such entangling 
alliances that have not only failed to correct, but have aggravated the 
very evils which they were designed to prevent. World Leadership then, 
did not require that the United States be involved in such issues with 
foreign nations. 
Just as Nation approved of Mr. Gresham's views, so it condemned 
Senator Frye's ideas. Nation commented on Frye's illogical tenacity to 
"seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the islands on the map." 
His desire for the United States to lead as a world power was not accepted 
by Nation.ll 
Both Nation and Forum presented views on the Monroe Doctrine and its 
application in these world affairs. 
Nation began its series of articles on this problem, in an editorial 
entitled, "Some Monroe Myths." It pointed out the fact that Seward's 
lOIbid., (June 28, 1894), p. 481. 
~ation, LX (April 11, 1895), p. 269. 
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ordering of the French out of Mexico was entirely different from sending 
the British out of Nicaragua. That was not a matter of showing the national 
prestige of the United States by enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, because the 
Monroe Doctrine was not involved in this cas8. l2 And later that year, in 
an editorial speaking of the Venezuelan difficulty, Nation commented: 
Whether Great Britain or Venezuela has the better historical 
and legal title to the territory 80 long in dispute between those 
two countries, no one without the easy omniscience of a Lodge, a 
Campbell, a Blaine, or a Tribune editor would venture to decide 
offhand •••• When Venezuela finds out that Salisbury and Chamber-
lain mean what they say, and that our Government means what it 
says - that there is no possibility of a bloody-Monroe doctrine 
war, in which we should get all the hard knocks and the Venezuelans 
all the glory -- negotiations with England will probably be re-
opened and the prolonged dispute amicably settled.13 
In an editorial the following week, Nation re-iterated its conviction that 
the United States had no duty or right by the Monroe Doctrine to protect 
the South American states "against the natural consequences of their own 
insolence and folly" -- that the United States did not have to become 
involved in every entanglement and war to show its leadership to the world.14 
It again rejected this involvement in another editorial in which it 
concluded: 
It is a remarkable example of the power ot words to take the 
place of ideas that our Government should now revert to the Monroe 
Doctrine and call upon us to stand by Venezuela, as a republic, 
against Great Britrdn -- our ally in the previous controversy --
l2Ibid., (May 9, 1895), p. 356. 
llriation, LXI (October 24, 1895), p. 286. 
14Ibid., (October 31, 1895), p. 305. 
as a monarchy •••• In a word, the American Secretary of State's 
Olney references to Venezuelan republicanism and friendship and 
English monarchy and hostility have no more to do with the facts 
than with the planet Jupiter.15 
The following month, r~ation showed her regret that the United States 
had to show her political power and her right as a leader in the world, 
by "insolence, abusiveness, and brutality," and that, in short, in inter-
national affairs, "the ruffianly way is the more excellent way." Nothing, 
Nation felt, was more of a discredit to our civilization and actually to 
our national preetige.16 
Oscar Straus, in his article in Forum, upheld the Monroe Doctrine as 
a preserver of peace, and maintained that every assertion of it Ithas had 
the effect of averting the calamities of war." Later he stated that: 
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"Mr. Cleveland has responded to this grave duty in order to avert a hostile 
collision between the two great English speaking peoples, who should ever 
remain strenuous and worthy rivals in all the acts of peace."17 
Forum also presented the views of J. W. Miller, Commander of the 
First Naval Battalion. Mr. Miller, in writing about the rumors of war, 
stated: 
Therefore, facing the situation fairly and squarely, convinced 
that the people demand the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we 
must at once put ourselves in a position to enforce with measurable 
l5Nation, LXII (January 2, 1896), p. 5. 
16 ( Ibid. , February 20, 1896) I p. 152. 
l70ecar S. Straus, "Lord Salisbury and the Monroe Doctrine," Forum, 
xx: (February, 1896), p. 720. 
dignity, a recognition of the American continental policy. The 
situation, the times, are ripe for quick action: the question is, 
What shall we do?lS 
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And Mr. Miller then concluded that the national prestige of the United States 
demanded that Congress begin the system of coast defenses and the construc-
tion of more battle-ships. The United States must take its position as a 
world leader. 
The Chairman of the Cuban Press Delegation also wrote in Fo~~ of the 
"perpetual source ot annoyance, of irritation, and of danger to the United 
States" of Spanish domination in Cuba. "Of danger," he stated, Itin so tar 
as it may, at any time, give rise to international complications of a 
nature which it is not possible to foresee. • • • Cuba will be a running sore 
in the side of the United States." And the only way for the United States 
to show her "political power" concluded Mr. Pierra, was "by complete 
cauterization," which meant the I~tter separation of Spain from the 
country.,,19 The United States must then retain her national prestige to be 
a world leader. 
And it the other powers ot the world are looking to the Pacific area, 
then the United States must do the same, according to Mr. Proctor, in 
his article in Forum. As he said: 
The presence of Russia in the Far East, and the possibility of a 
combination between Russia and China, tollowed by the awakening of 
China from her sleep of centuries, the extension of French dominion 
ISJ. W. Miller, "Rumors ot War and Resultant Duties, ft Forum, XXI 
(April, 1096), p. 240. . 
19Fidel G. Pierra, tiThe Presant &.00 Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII 
(February, 1897), pp. 669-670. 
in Indo-China, Siam, and Madagascar, the partitioning of Africa and 
the islands of the Pacific among European Powers; the industrial 
growth of Japan ••• all tend to change the front of the world, and .. 
to transfer to the placid Pacific the national activities which, 
for three centuries past, have rendered the Atlantic the theatre 
of stirring event.20 
So the United States must accept her role as a leader in the world of 
nations, and as a leader must retain her power through expansion in the 
Pacific area. It would follow then, that she must also protect this 
national prestige of hers, b,y being prepared and ready to fight for her 
political power. And it is this preparedness against the nations of the 
world that Murat Halstead pleaded for in his article in Forum, "American 
Annexation and Armament.,,21 
Nation quite clearly stated its over-all stand on this issue of 
national prestige and political power in its editorial, "Jingo Morality./I 
Nation explained: 
But there is a Jingoism which comes to us in quite another guise. 
It is clad in the soft raiment of an attractive literary style 
and wears an appearance of high philosophy. In fine Hegelian 
phrases it talks about a nation coming to self-consciousness, 
suddenly awaking to the fact that it has international duties 
as well as intemational rights and preparing to go forth with 
lofty benevolence, like a knight of the Round Table, to redress 
wrongs and establish justice the world over. 22 
20proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," Forum, XXIV 
(September, 1897), p. 38. 
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21 Halstead, "American Annexation and Armament," Forum, XXIV (September, 
1897), pp. 56-66. 
2~ation, LXI (October 3, 1895), pp. 234-235. 
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Nation accused Captain Mahan of being the leading exponent of this 
refined Jingoism, and believed that Mahan would logically accede to the 
fact that this "American domination over any inferior power would have 
nothing more to do with morality than an earthquake." But, Nation strongly 
maintained that this "earthquake and physical power doctrine is a most 
dangerous one for any time or people." In other words, it believed 
that this political power theme that would lead to world leadership, was 
simply a means used as justification for an ignorant and brutal proposal 
of foreign aggression and conquest. And this was not considered real 
power, nor would it lead to true world leaderehip.2.3 
Yet the argument that the United States must accept and if necessary 
fight to maintain her role as a world leader, was also strongly endorsed 
by the imperialists of 1898. This was all linked to the duty of the 
United States, to her natural right, to her national honor, to her 
vital necessity -- all of this implied in her world leadership role or 
pattern. 
2.3Ibid _. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCWSION 
It has been the purpose of this study to analyze expansionist feeling 
in the United States for the years 1893-1898, as it was reflected especially 
in two of the nation's periodical press, and to treat the evidences of this 
teeling in such a way as to shed light on the origins of American imperialism. 
Many years betore the United States, at the close ot the last century, 
embarked on a career of overseas expansion and took its place as one of the 
world t s great powers, signs and portents ot a rising interest in external 
atfairs made their appearance in the periodical literature. No claim is 
made that the expansionist sentiment in the periodicals was in itself 
responsible for the imperialist outburst ot 1898. But it is tirmly 
believed that the evidence presented demonstrates that the periodicals 
were an important agency tor creating an atmosphere tavorable to expansion. 
An important part of this atmosphere was the ideology ot expansion. 
The basic concepts that composed the tramework ot this ideology --
inevitable destiny, mission or "white man's burden," ideas of selt-defense, 
paramount interest, and world leadership -- made their appearance in the 
writings of such men as Fiske, Strong, Burgess, and Mahan. Placing emphasis 
upon these central ideas, these men furnished the American people with a 
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philosophical justification for expansion. However, the work of providing 
the nation with an expan"ionist ideology was by no means limited to a tGW 
individuals. These fundamental concepts were also being offered to the 
nation through an important segment of the popular press -- the periodical 
literature. 
In the periodicals studied, as in the writings of the theorists, 
racism appears to have been a dominant abstraction used to justify 
expansion. Here were emphasized the expansion qualities of the Anglo-
Saxon, his mission to give to others the benefits ot his superior in-
stitutions, and the need for racial unity as a means of extending his 
power and influence throughout the world. 
An examination of Forum indicates that racism was BIOst commonly 
revealed in the allusions the periodical made to the need for understanding, 
cooperation, and even unity among the English speaking peoples. In these 
allusions there is implied or expressed the belief that such a relationship 
would involve the increasing participation of the United States in matters 
lying bayom her own borders. They are, then, not only expressions ot 
racism but are also expressions of racial expansionism. 
There were, ot course, critics of racism, and Nation was one such 
critic. It was particularly adverse to furgess' brand of Teutonic racism, 
and it deplored the tendency on the part of many Americans to assume that 
it was the destiny of the Saxon not. merely to predominate in North America, 
but to monopoli se it. 
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Present also in the periodicals were allusions to other basic 
expansionist concepts. As it had many times before in American histor,y, 
the idea of destiny made its appearance. Editors and writers felt it 
necessary to support the idea of destiny. others, with more regard for 
semantics, argued simply that it was senseless to resist an expansion that 
was inevitable or predetermined, and some placed sxpansion still farther 
beyond the will of the American people and claimed that it was the destiny 
of others that was driving them into the arms of the United States. These 
ideas were seen frequently in the writings and articles of Forum. On the 
other hand, as seen in its articles, Nation deplored the search for glory 
and aggrandizement abroad and refused to accept the idea that this destiny 
was inevitable. It was critical in its writings of Mahan for speaking of 
the development of the nation and of national sentiment as a natural force. 
The record of Forum indicates also the prevalence of a sense of 
mission during this period, of a belief that expansion was necessary in 
order that the nation might do its duty in the spreading of civilization 
and democracy. The assertion of such claims brought from the anti-
expansionist Nation a particularly sharp rebuttal, and it severely 
criticized the hiding of this imperialistic tendency toward expansion 
behind the cloak or moral respectability. 
The literature studied al80 includes evidence or a growing feeling 
that expansion was dictated by certain vital national interests. Strategic 
interests were among the basic national interests driving the nation 
toward expansion~ The United States was in the midst of a period of naval 
revival. Much of the discussion in Forum relative to this revival stressed 
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the need for naval strength to secure the nation's defenses. But this was 
also the period of Mahan. Mahan's writings focused attention not upon 
narrow defensive needs but upon offensive action, upon the strategic 
importance of the Caribbean, the isthmian canal, and Hawaii. Even more 
important, by establishing the inter-relationship of industry, markets, 
bases, merchant marine, and nav,y~ he set forth a theory of sea power that 
was essentially a theory of mercantUe expansion. WhUe Forum, on the 
whole, supported these ideas of Mahan, ideas of self-defense and tnus 
naval necessity for security, Nation found reason to criticize both the 
general ideas of security and vital interest and the specific ideas of 
Mahan. 
Among the most important of the national or paramount interests 
impelling this country toward expansion was the economic interest. 
Although the pitfall of attributing the whole movement toward expansion 
to economic motives should be avoided, the evidence of the material in 
Forum and Nation makes it impossible to shove economic considerations 
into the background. Although there are only scattered evidences of a 
desire to expand politically in order to assure the nation'. economic 
prosperity, there was a large body of sentiment favoring extemal economic 
expansion. 
No evidence can really be found to prove or disprove the contention 
that ,.~ernal economic expansion was required to relieve industrial 
surpluses. But whether this need was real or imagined, Forum refiected 
a feeling that foreign markets were becoming essential to the nation·s 
economic welfare. Its articles showed the widespread feeling that the 
country must or should extend its economic activity beyond its bor.ders and 
develop and acquire markets abroad for its products. Nation, on the other 
hand, rejected these ideas. 
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It may, of course, be argued that during the early period there is 
little evidence that such expansion had become a vital necessity and that 
those who in editorials and articles advocated such a course were engaged 
in agitating a myth. There is no proof that during these years the country 
was faced with the problem of disposing of a surplus of industrial products 
and capital or that the extension of its economic activity abroad was in 
fact important to its welfare and. security. However, the period which 
closely followed was a period of tremendous external economic expansion, 
a period which saw the erection of a political and financial empire and 
the emergence of the United States as the world's dominant power. The 
advocates of economic expansion during the years 1893-1898 may have been 
anticipating the future; they helped prepare the way for the period that 
followed. 
The United States was also impelled toward expansion by the inter-
action of ideas and interests with events. The public discussion re-
flected in Forum stimulated the feeling that the United States should 
assume a larger role in world affairs, ~llle Nation held that expansionism 
was not necessary for national prestige and political power. The public 
debate over the Hawaiian issue, 1893-1895, contained all the elements 
needed for a debate on the whole problem of foreign acquisitions. Re-
vealed in the periodical literature, especially Forum, is a body of opinion 
which favored annexation for a wide variety of reasons -- strategic, 
economic, and human! tarian. But what is more important, this literature 
indicates that many believed Hawaiian annexation to be not a "sporadic 
effort," as Mahan phrased it, but rather as the first fruit of a compre-
hensi ve program of external expansion. 
Nation reflected evidences of anti-expansionist feeling. The ver,y 
existence of an opposition viewpoint is noteworthy, for it indicates 
that during these years expansionist sentiment was prevalent enough and 
strong enough to evoke a rebuttal. 
The af'lsumption may be made that since the origins of the new 
imperialism are to be detected in the periodical literature, so too, may 
the beginnings of the anti-imperialist movement of 1898-1900, embark 
permanently upon a career of imperialist aggrandizement. That the nation 
stopped short of such a career after 1900 was due in part to the influence 
of the anti-imperialists, and it is likely also that hostile critics of 
expansion during the period 1895-1898 shared in determining the course 
this nation was later to take. These early critics could not prevent the 
expansion of the United States, but by holding expansionist sentiment 
among their contemporaries up to the light of critical inquir,y, they 
helped insure that the nation in its twentieth century expansion would 
follow a path consistent with its better traditions, rather than the 
path ,~..,f imperialism. 
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The expansionist sentiment that appeared in the periodicals during 
the years 1893-1898 provides no definitive explanation for the expansion 
of the United States during the years that followed. The outburst of 1898, 
the arrival of the United States as a world power at the turn of the 
century, and the continu6d expansion of the nation's power and influence 
since that time are developments far too complex to be explained solely 
from the early signs of expansionist feeling in the periodicals. But 
these signa are important; that the United States was later to 
travel the road of external expansion was determined partly by the 
urgings of those who, during these germinal yearD, used the periodical 
press as a vehicle for their expansionist views. 
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